The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
826.
While
Mr Blair had proposed on 24 January that inspections, and
fortnightly
reports to
the Security Council should continue until the end of March,
the
timetable
being discussed on 30 January was that a decision on a
second
resolution
could be sought after more reports from Dr Blix.
827.
In his diary
for 29 January, Mr Campbell wrote:
“For
obvious reasons, Iraq was worrying TB more and more. He wasn’t
sure
Bush got
just how difficult it was going to be without a second UNSCR, for
the
Americans
as well as us. Everyone TB was speaking to, including tough guys
like
[John] Howard,
was saying that they need a second resolution or they wouldn’t
get
support. TB
felt that was the reality for him too, that he couldn’t deliver the
party
828.
Mr Rycroft
advised Mr Blair that he should tell President Bush
that:
“Even our
closest allies are clear about their own domestic political
constraints.
They would
all much prefer a second resolution if at all possible. You have to
have
one
too …
“… a
pattern of non‑co‑operation would not suffice for a French vote in
favour of
a second
resolution. Our assessment is that there are only four positive
votes …
“So it
follows that a WMD find or an Iraqi obstruction of the inspectors
would
transform
the international context. Short of that, we need a pattern of Blix
reports on
Iraqi
non‑co‑operation. This all points to a little more time – weeks not
months – as
you argued
in your Note, to improve the chances of securing a second
resolution.”272
829.
The
conversation on 29 January was brief.273
830.
Mr Blair
congratulated President Bush for setting out the case on Iraq in
his State
of the
Union address. He told President Bush that he [Mr Blair] was
speaking to several
colleagues
so that he would have a clear picture of their positions before
their meeting.
Dr Blix’s
January report had been much better than expected and had helped to
change
some
minds.
831.
Mr Blair
and President Bush agreed to speak the following day on a secure
line.
832.
In their
telephone conversation on 30 January, Mr Blair and President
Bush
discussed
the message that should come out of Mr Blair’s
visit.274
271
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
272
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Phone Call to
Bush’.
273
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 29 January’.
274
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush,
30 January’.
152