The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
There was a
serious chance that the UK could be regarded as being
an
Occupying
Power jointly with the US throughout the whole of Iraq. There
was
a much
clearer case that the UK is an Occupying Power within
MND(SE).
725.
Mr Llewellyn
commented:
“These
conclusions are not a surprise. They confirm the advice that we
have given
throughout
the period of occupation. In particular, we have assessed all draft
CPA
legislation
against occupation law … We have been largely successful in
keeping
the
legislation within the UK’s international legal obligations, but
the following are
areas of
risk …”
726.
Mr Llewellyn
then listed several provisions within the CPA ‘s orders and
regulations
which he
was concerned that the CPA may not have had the authority to make,
or where
the UN
representative had not been consulted as required by resolution
1483.
727.
On 9 February,
FCO officials provided Mr Cannon with a brief for a planned
video
conference
between Mr Blair and President Bush.396
They judged
the priority for the
discussion
to be the Security Agreement. The US had a different approach to
the UK:
they did
not believe it worthwhile to attempt to negotiate an agreement with
the Iraqis on
security
because any agreement made with the GC would be invalid after 30
June.
728.
Instead, the
US believed that resolution 1511 authorised an MNF presence
after
30 June
and that CPA Order 17, which provided for immunities for Coalition
Forces,
would
remain valid after the handover. UK lawyers doubted this
interpretation, while
policy
officials were concerned that the other permanent members of the UN
Security
Council
would claim that, without a new agreed basis for the Coalition
presence, the
occupation
was continuing.
729.
More
importantly for the UK’s military objectives, the lack of a new
UN
authorisation
could cause difficulties for the Coalition’s key partners in the
MNF. Mr Blair
was advised
that the best course would be an exchange of letters between the GC
and
the
Coalition, followed by a further resolution endorsing the continued
MNF presence.
730.
The covering
note from Mr Straw’s Private Secretary said that reporting
from
Washington
and Baghdad suggested the US was considering delaying the 30
June
handover.
She suggested that in the video conference:
“The Prime
Minister might underline the damage any postponement would do to
our
credibility
inside Iraq and internationally.”
731.
In a
background note appended to the brief there was some positive news
of
“growing
evidence that Sistani is resigned to no elections before
June”.
396
Owen to
Cannon, 9 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s VTC with President
Bush’.
326