The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… The
loyalties of key institutions to the Iraqi state is mixed at best.
Some
40 percent
of the Iraqi Police Service is thought to owe loyalty to militias
linked to
political
parties. Other security bodies … have become personal militias for
Ministers
or
Provincial Governors.”
84.
In relation to
the impact of the US surge, the paper said it had:
“… so far
delivered mixed results. The US military has been taking the
fight
to AQ-I …
US troops are getting into areas … they have not been in for some
time.
But US
commanders are worried that the Iraqi Security Forces are not up to
the
job of
holding onto the ground they have won – suggesting that the
security gains
from the
surge may prove unsustainable when US troop levels begin to
reduce.”
85.
The paper also
explained:
“One
consequence of the surge and benchmarks has been that the earlier
shared
US/UK
emphasis on transferring security responsibility to the Iraqis has
been
sidelined
in favour of a short-term focus on improving security.
“General
Petraeus … and his staff now believe transition was happening too
quickly
in 2006 –
indeed that the previous coalition strategy represented a ‘rush to
failure’.”
86.
As a result,
the context in which transition in Basra was being considered
had
changed:
“The US are
more, not less risk-averse. They are intensely nervous about
transition
in Basra.
They believe the local Iraqi Security Forces are not robust enough
to
handle
security without our direct support. They see pervasive, malign
Iranian
influence.
And even the Iraqi Government, who had earlier been pressing
for
transition,
has recently been more ambivalent.
“The US
fear that the handover of the last province in the UK sector will
signal a
UK decision
to withdraw entirely from Iraq in the near future, precipitating
similar
moves by
other coalition members. And they fear that doing this in August
would
pose
significant risks for the credibility of their attempt in September
to persuade
Congress to
extend the surge.”
87.
The paper
explained the process and conditions that needed to be met to
achieve
PIC, and
said:
“One
further important consideration has informed our (but not US)
thinking about
the timing
of PIC … is about the balance of risk in retaining or handing over
security
responsibility.
Do we assess that we have reached the stage where the
benefits
of
retaining security responsibility are outweighed by the downsides?
It there any
prospect
that by holding on, we can hope either to effect further positive
change,
or to
provide the time needed by the Iraqis to meet the challenges
themselves?”
200