The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
584.
Mr Blair spoke
to Prime Minister Ja’afari for the first time on 26 May and said
that
“we stood
ready to help in any way we could”, in particular on developing the
ISF.323
585.
Mr Blair
committed to reinforcing the ITG’s message that it was “an
inclusive
Government
for all Iraq’s communities”.
586.
On 26 May, Mr
Blair told President Bush that he was concerned about
increasing
sectarian
tensions in Iraq, and how they might be exploited by
insurgents.324
He
thought
that the US
and UK should make sure that the programme of Sunni outreach
was
pursued
“with real vigour”.
587.
The newly
formed Iraq Sub Committee of the Defence and Overseas
Policy
Committee
(DOP(I)) met for the first time on 26 May, chaired by Mr
Blair.325
588.
The Committee
was briefed by Mr Ehrman on attitudes within the Sunni
community
to the
political process, and by Gen Walker on the military campaign and
Security Sector
Reform.
589.
In discussion
it was observed that the number of sectarian attacks
was
increasing, and
that in considering force posture in Iraq, the UK would also
need
to consider
the “strategic balance with UK military activity in Afghanistan”.
It was
essential
that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan each had sufficient
military and
civilian resources
available.
590.
Mr Benn gave
an overview of the reconstruction process and the need to
increase
international
involvement (see Section 10.2).
591.
At the end of
the meeting, Mr Blair asked for more advice, including a
Sunni
outreach
strategy and an options paper on UK force posture in Iraq over the
next
nine months.
323
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 26 May 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation with
Ja’afari’.
324
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 26 May 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s videoconference
with President Bush’.
325
Minutes, 26
May 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
488