13.1 |
Resources
99.
Mr Brown
told the Inquiry that all the MOD’s claims for UORs had been
met.77
He also
explained that the “ceiling” was not a limit on UOR expenditure,
but an estimate
of likely
expenditure:
“At all
times we said, ‘Here is the money … Once you have spent that, then
we are
prepared –
and always were ready to and actually did – deliver
more.’”
100.
Mr Tom
McKane, MOD Director General Resources and Plans from
September
2002 to
January 2006, who was responsible for establishing the arrangements
for
securing
funding for UORs in the period leading up to the invasion, told the
Inquiry that
he was
satisfied with the Treasury’s response to the MOD’s requests for
UORs:
“Inevitably
… there is an anxiety and a concern on the part of the Ministry
of
Defence to
get on with things … and it did take a month or so after my
first
engagement
in this for the agreements [on UORs] to be reached … But
thereafter,
the process
operated smoothly.
“There were
some, I think, who were probably frustrated at the fact … that we
were
given
tranches of money … we would get quite quickly to the point where
we had
exhausted
the first tranche and were then involved in the preparation of
ministerial
correspondence
to secure the release of the next tranche …
“… but I
don’t remember it [the use of tranches] being a major obstacle to
the
101.
The provision
of military equipment, including UORs, is described in Sections
6.3
and
14.
102.
Mr Nye
advised Mr Brown on 11 October that Mr Hoon was expected
to write to
Mr Blair
shortly, setting out the military forces required for a
campaign.79
The
Treasury
had now
established good communications with the MOD, and MOD officials
had
assured the
Treasury that Mr Blair would be presented with “cost
information”.
103.
While there
were still huge uncertainties involved in forecasting costs, the
MOD
had
provided the Treasury with “some indicative breakdowns” which the
Treasury was
scrutinising.
The MOD estimated that Package 2 (predominantly air and maritime
forces)
was likely
to cost up to £1bn, and Package 3 (Package 2 plus ground forces)
between
£1.5bn and
£2bn.
104.
Mr Nye
invited Mr Brown to “consider whether the extra political
impact for the UK
of Package
3 merits the additional £0.5bn to £1bn cost (and of course the
additional risk
to British
troops)”.
77
Public
hearing, 5 March 2010, page 94.
78
Public
hearing, 2 July 2010, pages 35-36.
79
Minute Nye
to Chancellor, 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq:
Decisions Nearing’.
461