The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the US
military was developing its own mass employment schemes and USAID
was
considering
what more it might do.
928.
The official
commented that it was possible that the US could “do things” that
the
UK had not
tried, as it could:
•
dedicate
more people and more money to the task;
•
change the
security environment to secure better civilian access;
•
operate
outside Iraqi structures;
•
ensure
better linkages to US work in Baghdad; and
•
“apply
sufficient clout at the Baghdad end” to secure the Iraqi
Government’s
attention.
929.
The UK was
lobbying the US on the need to engage with local
government
and the PRT
in order to avoid setting up parallel systems and losing the
benefits of
local
knowledge and experience. The key risk was that UK programmes
(which were
designed to
be Iraqi-led, and thus required a considerable amount of Iraqi
engagement
and energy)
would be “crowded out” as Iraqi counterparts focused on the larger
and
more
immediate US programmes.
930.
A UK official
in the Basra PRT agreed with that assessment and
commented:
“None of
this is going to stop and it is going to be a big distraction for a
small PRT
team …
trying to force the military to listen to what we have to say, and
trying to stop
MNF taking
over the show completely … It’s not just on the
economic/governance
agenda –
it’s the same for our CivPol mission and all the policing work we
have
931.
In his weekly
report of 10 April, Maj Gen White-Spunner described
recent
events as:
“… a real
opportunity for Basra and hence our involvement here. The time for
any
recrimination
… is behind us; we now have a better chance than we have
arguably
had for two
years to achieve better security and some initial development goals
in
the city.
We will not have long to do so …” 545
932.
Dr Christian
Turner, Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat,
sent
Mr Brown
an assessment of the implications of the Charge of the Knights on
11 April,
in advance
of Mr Brown’s visit to Washington.546
Dr Turner
described the UK’s military
options
(step up to take full responsibility for MND(SE), steady-state or
an accelerated
withdrawal).
544
Email FCO
[junior official] to Hendrie, 9 April 2008, ‘Basra’.
545
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 10 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter –
10 April 2008’.
546
Minute
Turner to Prime Minister, 11 April 2008, ‘Iraq: Implications of
Basra Operations and US Visit’.
346