12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
253.
The AHMGIR
next discussed SSR on 17 July for which the IPU – which had
been
renamed the
‘Iraq Policy Unit’ – provided an update paper.208
The paper
stated that
there had
been considerable progress in various SSR areas but that there was
still no
cohesive
strategy. That lack of strategy was described as “not necessarily …
a cause for
current
alarm” as it was a reflection of the rapidly moving situation in
Iraq.
254.
The paper
described the splitting of SSR responsibilities as a “set back”
and
informed
Ministers that there were now four senior UK personnel in Baghdad
working in
each of the
main SSR areas (policing, intelligence, army and the MOD).
Agreement that
DCC Brand
would serve as Mr Kerik’s chief adviser was “an important
gain”.
255.
The paper
mentioned the requirement for approximately 7,000 international
police
officers.
The US intended to provide 700 and the UK 100.
256.
At the meeting
of the AHMGIR, the IPU described the 7,000 target as
“ambitious”
although
they considered that the Organisation for Security and Co‑operation
in Europe
(OSCE)
might provide support.209
By that
stage, a police donors’ conference should
have been
held and international contributions established according to the
original FCO
timeline
produced on 3 June. The fact that timelines were slipping was not
mentioned
at the
meeting or in the update paper.
257.
On 1 August,
the UND wrote to DCC Brand asking him to push for a
policing
strategy
and stating:
“The UK and
other states will be reluctant to engage in the reform of the Iraqi
police
service
unless we are shown that there is a clear strategy … If the CPA
Interior
Ministry is
genuinely considering the deployment of a significant mentoring
mission,
it will
urgently need to address these issues and make its case to a wider
audience.
We fully
appreciate the constraints of the operating environment, but we are
keen to
keep up
momentum and build on progress made.”210
258.
Formal police
training began in late June.211
On 16 July,
the first 150 students
graduated
from the Transition Integration Programme – a three‑week course
designed
for
existing police officers and run by the US Military Police in
Baghdad.212
259.
The same
month, Ambassador Bremer recommended that the training of
police
be
accelerated and that additional international police be deployed to
protect critical
208 Annotated
Agenda, 17 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation attaching
Paper IPU,
16 July
2003, ‘Security Sector Reform the Next Steps’.
209
Minutes, 17
July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
210
Minute UND
[junior official] to Brand, 1 August 2003, ‘Iraq Police Reform: UK
Priorities’.
211
Minute
Brand, 16 July 2003, ‘Report from Iraq – Douglas
Brand’.
212
The same
programme is also sometimes referred to as Training in Post
(TIP).
213
Email
Rumsfeld to Feith, 8 July 2003, ‘Police in Iraq’.
113