10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

patiently during that period, June, July, August, the relationships had started coming

together very well.”359

650. The Cabinet Office advised Ministers on 21 August that, conscious of growing

public frustration in the South with living conditions and the underlying causes of

the riots earlier in the month, the UK was taking action both in CPA(South) and with

CPA(Baghdad) to improve the delivery of basic services.360 CPA(South) and MND(SE)

were increasing fuel stocks, exploring ways to improve water supply, and working to

improve the electricity supply to the Basra oil refinery.

651. There had been a series of meetings in CPA(Baghdad) on electricity and

utilities. Ambassador Bremer had accepted “all recommendations related to the

electricity problem in the South” and authorised US$200m for immediate remedial work.

Electricity generation and transmission were to have top priority. The UK was seeking

further details.

652. On the same day, Mr Benn met informally with Mr Dennis McShane, FCO Minister

for Europe, and Mr Adam Ingram, MOD Minister for Armed Forces.361 The meeting

agreed that:

• Sir Hilary Synnott needed “operations support”. DFID hoped to give Sir Hilary

delegated authority to spend UK funds when CPA(South) was fully staffed.

• A strong UK delegation should attend the CENTCOM infrastructure

Conference the following week, which would produce a strategy for improving

Iraq’s infrastructure. In parallel, a team from engineering firm Mott MacDonald

would visit Basra to prepare shorter-term proposals to improve power supply in

the South.

• Thereafter, the UK “should decide fast on remedial action”. That might require

more UK expenditure if the CPA could not respond fast enough.

653. The Ministers directed officials to report to the 28 August meeting of the AHMGIR

on why so little of the funding allocated to CPA(South) had been spent.

654. An MOD official produced an informal record of the meeting for MOD colleagues

only.362 He commented:

“DFID (Benn/[DFID junior official]) v[ery] helpful and forward leaning, going so far

as to identify fact that c. £30m of DFID allocation for Iraq remains unspent and that

perhaps now, and on utilities in the South, is the time and place to spend it …

“This prompted a sensible discussion (first I have heard at an Ad Hoc Group) of the

consequences of the CPA actually not delivering in the medium term in the South …

359 Public hearing, 6 July 2010, pages 28-29.

360 Paper Cabinet Office, 20 August 2003, ‘Update for Ministers 21 August 2003’.

361 Letter Drummond to Owen, 21 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Informal Ministerial’.

362 Email IRAQ-AD SEC-S to PJHQ-J9-HDPOLOPS3-S, 21 August 2003, ‘Not the Ad Hoc Ministerial’.

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