The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
528.
UNSCOM
subsequently reported that its team had concluded that none of
the
components
of the material balance for biological weapons could be
verified.212
529.
As requested
in the Presidential Statement of 14 May, Dr ElBaradei
submitted an
“interim
status report” on 27 July.213
The report
contained little new information, although
it did
state that Iraq had been unable to locate any additional documents
about the
decision to
abandon the nuclear programme.
530.
In addition,
Dr ElBaradei reported that Mr Aziz had reiterated that Iraq’s
programme
of
declarations and unilateral destruction had been “an undocumented
ad hoc progression
of
activities undertaken in reaction to events”; and he had stated
“unequivocally” that
“no
Government decree existed which formalised Iraq’s abandonment of
its nuclear
programme”.
Mr Aziz had added that, “had such a decree existed, it would
clearly have
been in the
best interests of Iraq to make it available to
the IAEA”.
531.
Dr ElBaradei
observed:
“It is
perhaps of little practical significance whether a so-called ‘high
government
committee’
was formally constituted or was … an ad hoc group of
varying
composition
brought together to deal with problems as they arose.”
532.
In relation to
the actions attributed by Iraq to Lt Gen Kamil, Dr ElBaradei
added
that it was
“beyond debate that concealment of components of Iraq’s
clandestine
nuclear programme
continued until at least August 1995”, and it remained “difficult
for
IAEA to
distinguish the actions of such a senior Government official from
that of the
Government
itself”.
533.
Dr ElBaradei
also reiterated the importance, given the inherent
uncertainties
arising
from a verification process with the aim of proving the absence of
readily
concealable
items, of continuing intrusive inspections as part of the ongoing
monitoring
and
verification of Iraq’s activities. This was necessary to “provide a
significant
probability
of detecting prohibited equipment, materials or activities at other
locations”
as well as
assurance of the absence of those items at routinely inspected
locations.
534.
After its
visit to Iraq in April 1998, the IAEA reported that it had “found
no
indications
that Iraq has retained the physical capability – in terms of
hardware and
facilities
– to produce weapons-usable nuclear material. Nor are there any
indications
of Iraq
having achieved its programme goal of producing nuclear
weapons”.214
The
IAEA could
not provide assurances that there were no “readily concealable
items such
as
components of centrifuge machines”. In addition, because of the
progress that
212
UN Security
Council, 6 October 1998, ‘Report of the Executive Chairman of
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1998/920).
213
UN Security
Council, 27 July 1998, ‘Interim status report of the Director
General of the International
Atomic
Energy Agency in response to the Presidential statement on Iraq of
14 May 1998’ (S/1998/694).
214
Interim
Status Report on Nuclear Inspections in Iraq, IAEA Press Release PR
98/12, 28 July 1998.
120