6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

372. Mr Drummond raised the issue with Sir David Manning again on 30 August.213

He recalled that Sir David had commented earlier in the summer that it was too soon to

think about management of the unintended consequences of conflict, but that the issue

would probably need to be discussed in the autumn.

373. Mr Drummond enclosed a “skeleton” paper on the subject prepared by a Cabinet

Office junior official and suggested meeting to discuss the paper and Whitehall

machinery for Iraq at the same time.

374. The Cabinet Office paper on unintended consequences focused on the

possible impact of war on UK interests and on countries in the region, rather than

on post-conflict Iraq.

375. The FCO produced a more substantial paper on the unintended consequences

of conflict for the region and beyond on 20 September.214 The paper is described later

in this Section.

376. Also attached to Mr Drummond’s minute was a “list of headings for future work”

on unintended consequences, which included: “avoiding fragmentation of a failed

state in Iraq”.

377. Sir David Manning replied to Mr Drummond: “Let us discuss p[lea]se with Tom

McKane before he goes. We need to do this work: there is a question about timing.”215

378. Mr McKane sent Sir David Manning a note on possible machinery “for managing

Iraq” on 2 September.216 He recalled that he and Sir David had already agreed that,

“following the pattern of Afghanistan”, there should be two groups of officials; an “inner

group” chaired by Sir David (or Mr Desmond Bowen who would shortly be taking over

from Mr McKane as Sir David’s Deputy in OD Sec) and a more junior “wider group”,

chaired by Mr Bowen or Mr Drummond.

379. Mr McKane proposed that the inner group “should begin work once you [Sir David

Manning] decide that the time is right”. It would comprise the Chair of the JIC or Chief of

the Assessments Staff, the FCO Middle East Director, the Deputy Chief of the Defence

Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)) and/or Mr Ian Lee (MOD Director General Operational

Policy (DG OpPol)), and representatives of all three Intelligence Agencies and the Home

Office. Mr McKane asked whether it should also include the DIS and a No.10 information

specialist. He proposed that the wider group “should meet periodically from now on and,

inter alia, address the issues set out in Jim Drummond’s minute of 30 August”.

213 Minute Drummond to Manning, 30 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Unintended Consequences’ attaching Note

Cabinet Office, 30 August 2002, ‘Outline of a Paper: Iraq: Managing the Unintended Consequences’ and

Paper Cabinet Office, 28 August 2002, ‘Unintended Consequences of War on Iraq: Skeleton of Paper’.

214 Paper Directorate for Strategy and Innovation, [undated], ‘Iraq – Consequences of Conflict for the

Region and Beyond’.

215 Manuscript comment Manning on Minute Drummond to Manning, 30 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Unintended

Consequences’.

216 Minute McKane to Manning, 2 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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