The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

881. Lt Gen Austin asked him to sit out of the meeting “as things were a little sensitive

between the PM [Maliki] and the UK”. Brig Free was clear that that was the right call:

Prime Minister Maliki had made it “abundantly clear that he will not meet with a British

officer … he sees us as responsible for releasing the very criminals responsible for

destabilising Basra, the ones he is now having to deal with”.

882. Mr Brown’s Private Secretary gave him an update on developments on 28 March,

reporting that neither side had yet achieved a decisive advantage and it was looking

increasingly likely that a stalemate would develop.434 The deadline for Prime Minister

Maliki’s disarmament ultimatum had been extended to 8 April, but the best outcome was

likely to be “some form of fudge through which both sides can claim victory”. Publicly,

Prime Minister Maliki remained committed to defeating JAM.

883. The Private Secretary told Mr Brown that the next step was for him to speak to

Prime Minister Maliki “to register our concern at lack of consultation in advance of the

operation; and to offer further UK assistance”. Mr Browne would update Parliament

following the outcome of NSID’s discussion of troop levels.

884. A report from the British Embassy Office Basra on 28 March suggested that

“the current assessment is that the fighting is likely to be protracted”.435 The perception

remained that the operation was targeted against JAM in general and not the criminal

elements, which was “causing militia groups and Basra JAM to unite”.

885. Maj Gen White-Spunner returned to Basra on Friday 28 March and spoke by

telephone to Governor Waili who reported that he had been present at a meeting that

included Prime Minister Maliki and OMS representatives.436 Prime Minister Maliki had

been persuaded to attend only on the basis that “he would not negotiate but only listen

to what OMS had to say”. OMS agreed to consider the Iraqi Government’s suggestions

that militia should hand over medium/heavy weapons and that senior leaders should

hand themselves in.

886. Prime Minister Maliki made a statement on Iraqi television on 29 March. He said

that he was trying to build a state governed by law and order and accused ex-Ba’athists

and people with “influences from across the border” of not wishing stability for Iraq. He

said that he had come to Basra to remove “gangs and thugs” – as long as such people

were around there could be no future – and reiterated his intention to stay in Basra “until

all had subjected themselves to the rule of law”.

887. There were reports in the Iraqi media that more than 100 police officers had been

sacked in Basra, apparently for losing their weapons and/or abandoning their posts

during the recent clashes.

434 Minute Turner to Prime Minister, 28 March 2008, ‘Basra’.

435 eGram 11870/08 Basra to FCO London, 28 March 2008, ‘Basra – Update 27/28 March 2008’.

436 eGram 11975/08 Basra to FCO London, 29 March 2008, ‘Basra – Update – 29 March’.

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