9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
131.
Accounts from
mid-2006 suggested that security in MND(SE) was a
significant
concern,
characterised by “steady, if generally unspectacular,
decline”41
and
increased
militia
activity. The UK military’s approach had generated US concern and
the security
situation
was limiting UK civilian activity.
132.
Gen Jackson’s
assessment in May of the short-term security prospects in
Iraq
was bleak.
He judged that “what we will leave behind will not look much like
strategic
success.
Ten years hence our strategy may fully bear fruit.”42
133.
After visiting
Iraq in early May, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of
the
Defence
Staff, advised Dr Reid that there should be no change to the
operational
approach
and that there were “compelling reasons” why the UK should “press
on”
with
handing over security to Iraq, including to permit the UK’s
continuing build-up in
Afghanistan.43
ACM Stirrup
identified the risk that UK withdrawal from Basra would
be
seen as a
“strategic failure” and suggested that “astute conditioning of the
UK public
may be
necessary” to avoid that.
134.
ACM Stirrup’s
view that the UK should press ahead with drawdown despite
the
security
challenges in Basra was not consistent with Government policy that
withdrawal
should be
conditions-based.
135.
ACM Stirrup’s
acceptance that the “law of diminishing returns” was “now firmly
in
play” and
that there was “an increasing risk” that UK forces would “become
part of the
problem,
rather than the solution” had some validity: it was clear from
accounts of the
situation
in Basra that UK forces were not preventing a steady decline in
security. ACM
Stirrup was
also right to advise Dr Reid that the MNF in Iraq faced a
“multifaceted”,
sophisticated
and dangerous enemy; that serious issues remained in Basra
(militia
activity,
poor governance, insecurity); and that it was possible the UK would
be accused
of
strategic failure.
136.
The
established policy was that UK forces would withdraw as the
capabilities of the
ISF
increased until responsibility could be handed over to the Iraqi
Government. ACM
Stirrup’s
proposed remedy of continued drawdown and managing public opinion
did not
mitigate
the risk of strategic failure he described.
137.
In the summer
of 2006, in recognition of the need to stabilise Basra and
prepare
it for
transition to Iraqi control, the UK developed the Basra Security
Plan, “a plan to
improve
Basra through operations, high impact reconstruction and SSR
[Security Sector
Reform] …
lasting for up to six months”.44
The
military element of the plan became
known as
Operation SALAMANCA and included operations against militia
groups.
41
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East to
Dowse, 12 May 2006, ‘Situation
in Basrah’.
42
Minute CGS
to CDS, 22 May 2006, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 15-18 May
06’.
43
Minute
Stirrup to SofS [MOD], 8 May 2006, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq and
Afghanistan – 5-7 May 06’.
44
Minute
Burke-Davies to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 August 2006,
‘Iraq: Op SALAMANCA’.
493