9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
313.
The IPU
concluded that there should be a public statement, which would
make
clear that
drawdown was conditional on successful elections in January and
December
2005,
progress in training the ISF and completion of the Petraeus Plan.
The IPU
considered
the relationship between the insurgency and drawdown and observed
that:
“… some
insurgents are beginning to conclude that US/UK refusal to specify
an
end-date is
evidence that we are in it for the long haul, that they are not
going to win
militarily
and, therefore, that they should engage on the political track
…”
314.
The IPU also
proposed that a public statement “should make clear that MNF
would
not be able
to draw-down quickly, or could even increase numbers, if the
insurgency
continued
as now”.
315.
The following
day, the media reported that Mr Annan was urging
caution.164
In a letter
to leaders of the US, UK and Iraq he warned of the potential impact
of major
military
offensives on Iraq’s political process and warned:
“The threat
or actual use of force not only risks deepening the sense of
alienation
of certain
communities, but would also reinforce perceptions among the
Iraqi
population
of a continued military Occupation.”
316.
Mr Annan wrote
that “forthcoming elections are the keystone in a broader
process
to restore
stability and legitimacy in Iraq”.
317.
The BBC
reported that Prime Minister Allawi called the letter “confused”
and said:
“… if Mr
Annan thought he could prevent insurgents in Fallujah from
‘inflicting
damage and
killing’, he was welcome to try.”165
318.
A copy of
Prime Minister Allawi’s written response was provided to Mr Blair.
It said:
“Even now,
the door remains open to these groups [insurgents] to embrace
the
rule-of-law,
to put down their weapons, and to join the political process … But,
again
I fear that
we have all but exhausted the comprehensive dialogue that we
have
conducted.
We are now left with few options. I believe it is the Government’s
duty
now to act
in order to safeguard lives, elections and democracy in Iraq from
those
choosing
the path of violence and atrocities.”166
319.
Mr Chaplin
told the Inquiry:
“In the end
I think Allawi felt compelled to act – the reason he felt compelled
was
because it
was such a serious part of the security threat.
164
BBC
News, 6
November 2004, Kofi
Annan’s letter; Falluja warning.
165
BBC
News, 6
November 2004, US strikes
raze Falluja hospital.
166
Letter
Allawi to Annan, 6 November 2004, [untitled].
447