10.4 |
Conclusions: Reconstruction
Audits
undertaken by the US Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR)
found that
the CPA failed to enforce adequate management, financial and
contractual
controls
over approximately US$8.8bn of DFI money, and that there was “no
assurance
that the
funds were used for the purposes mandated by resolution
1483”.11
Ambassador
Bremer
disagreed with that assessment.
The CPA
excluded the UK from decisions on disbursements from the DFI. Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock,
the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq from September
2003 to
March 2004,
told the Inquiry: “The UK was not allowed sight of any of the
figures on the
use of
money by the CPA … London made it quite clear that they didn’t
expect me to be
Section 9.8
addresses the UK’s inability to influence decisions made by the
CPA,
commensurate
with its responsibilities as an Occupying Power.
43.
On 3 June,
following a visit to Iraq, Mr Blair told Ministers that the
Government
should
return to “a war footing” to avoid “losing the peace in
Iraq”.13
44.
Following the
adoption of resolution 1483, with the AHMGIR now
established,
and with Mr
Blair and DFID engaged, there was a chance to set clear and
realistic
priorities
for the UK’s reconstruction effort, within the framework provided
by a broader
UK strategy
for Iraq, and to identify and secure the human and financial
resources
necessary
to manage and deliver that effort.
45.
Despite Mr
Blair’s recognition of the risk that the UK could lose the peace in
Iraq,
the
Government failed to take that chance. There are no indications
that Mr Blair’s
direction
led to any substantive changes in the UK’s reconstruction
effort.
46.
From early
June 2003, and throughout the summer, there were signs that
security
in Baghdad
and the South was deteriorating. Following the attack on UN staff
on
19 August,
UN and other international staff withdrew from Iraq.
47.
The Government
was aware by early June that the Danish Head of
ORHA(South),
Ambassador
Ole Olsen, might shortly leave Iraq.
48.
In June,
driven by the Government’s concern over the declining level of
consent for
the UK
military presence in the South, which the Government attributed to
CPA(South’s)
inability
to deliver reconstruction, DFID agreed to provide £15m to support
CPA(South)
and Quick
Impact Projects (QIPs) delivered by the UK Armed Forces. DFID
and
MOD
officials also advised Ministers that the Government needed to
“identify a line of
11 Bowen
SW Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
12
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, pages 50‑51.
13
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting’,
3 June’.
535