3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
certain
that Saddam would play carefully and long to undermine the
coalition we put
together to
pass the first resolution.”
482.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell discussed the possibility that a second
resolution
might not
be agreed, whether they would be free to follow the “Kosovo model”
and what
Security
Council members opposed to the use of force might do. Mr Straw
said that
“good
wording in the first resolution would change the politics”. They
agreed to discuss
the issues
further after Mr Straw had spoken to Mr Blair and
Sir Jeremy Greenstock.
483.
In parallel
discussions with Dr Rice and in the context of clear US
concerns
about the
potential timetable required by inspections, Sir David
Manning
emphasised
the importance of inspections and the need for a report
to
the Security
Council before addressing enforcement. Dr Rice asked
for
Mr Blair’s views.
484.
Mr Blair
stated that Iraq needed to be played cleverly, using a step by
step
approach to
convince opinion that action was needed.
485.
Sir David
Manning and Dr Rice also discussed the developing thinking on
a
UN resolution
on 10 September.153
Sir David
reported to Mr Blair that Dr Rice had told
him
President Bush was:
“… keen to
find a way to ensure the onus was put back on Saddam. We did
not
want the
‘inspectors searching around forever’ in a game of cat and mouse.
Bush
was uneasy
about finding himself in the position of asking the Security
Council
to give
Saddam a last chance when Saddam had been given so many
last
chances already.”
486.
Sir David
had replied that this:
“… was
unavoidable: we would inevitably be in the business of giving
Saddam
‘another
last chance’. This had its difficulties. But it had the overriding
benefit of
ensuring
that we could attract widespread international support by making
clear
that we
wanted to go the UN route. And this ‘last chance’ came with the
widespread
expectation
that, this time we meant business.”
487.
Dr Rice
told Sir David that the US Administration was:
“…
exploring the possibility of tabling a resolution in two parts. The
first would
stipulate
that Saddam must make a declaration within fifteen to thirty
days
explaining
why there had been a discrepancy between his claims and those of
the
UNSCOM
inspectors … in 1998. He would be required to account for the
materials
that UNSCOM
had been unable to identify and to promise that UNSCOM
would
have access
to any that were remaining. This would challenge him to
provide
physical
evidence relating to his WMD programme, as well as test his
commitment
153
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 10 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation
with Condi Rice’.
175