The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
including
credibility of plans for the aftermath. Mr Johnson described the
proposed UK
AOR in the
South as “a coherent one”.
1095.
Mr Hoon’s
letter to No.10 was sent on 16 January.
1096.
The Inquiry
has not seen any indication of the detailed analysis
supporting
the
conclusion that the proposed AOR in the South was “a coherent
one”.
1097.
Before the
meeting with the Chiefs of Staff, Mr Rycroft provided Mr
Blair
with “some
difficult questions” to raise, as suggested by Mr Powell, including
on
post‑conflict
issues:
“– What
military involvement do you foresee in the aftermath?
– Will we
be running Basra?
– Will the
targeting in the campaign take account of the need to run (parts
of) Iraq
1098.
Definitive
answers to those questions required cross-departmental
advice
and
collective consideration. There is no indication that other
departments were
consulted
formally before or immediately after the meeting on 15
January.
1099.
On 15
January, Mr Blair told the Chiefs of Staff “the ‘Issue’ was
aftermath –
the
Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine fighting breaking
out”.
1100.
Mr Blair
agreed that much greater clarity was needed on US intentions
and
asked the
MOD to think through the unexpected, including on oil, use of WMD
and
internecine
fighting.
1101.
Several
accounts of the 15 January meeting were produced by MOD
participants,
in addition
to a No.10 record of the discussion (see Section 6.2).
1102.
The
“unofficial” PJHQ account of Mr Blair’s meeting produced for Lt Gen
Reith,
who was in
the Middle East at the CENTCOM Commanders’ Conference,
provided
the fullest
account of the discussion of post-conflict issues. Issues raised by
Mr Blair
included:
“Worst
Case. The PM wanted to know what CDS [Adm Boyce] thought was
the
worst case
scenario. After much discussion about destroying the oil
infrastructure,
use of WMD
and hunkering down in Baghdad and fighting it out, it was felt that
the
worst case
was internecine fighting between Sunni and Shia, as well as the
Kurds/
Turks/Iraqis.
“Aftermath.
This led on to a general discussion on aftermath, with the PM
asking
what the
Iraqi view on it was. CDS stated that the thinking on this issue
was ‘woolly’
at this
stage, with work only just beginning. The PM stated that the
‘Issue’ was
529
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 14 January 2003, Iraq: Military
Planning: Meeting with Chiefs of Staff’.
298