The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
113.
General
Sir Richard Dannatt, Assistant Chief of the General Staff from
2001 to
2002, told
the Inquiry that in 2001‑2002 “as we were moving towards an
expeditionary
era” after
the Cold War, the Army had identified a clear requirement for
“vehicles that
were small
and light enough to go into aircraft to be flown to trouble spots,
but heavy
and capable
enough to be useful and usable when they got
there”.51
He said
that formed
the basis
of the FRES programme, which had been approved in
2002.
114.
Gen Dannatt
described FRES as “a rapid programme”; an “urgent”
short‑to‑medium
term requirement that “needed to be filled quite quickly”. In his
view,
“85 percent
of the solution delivered quickly would have been the right
answer”.
The intention
was “to go to the market and see what was out there and procure
it”:
“… our
aspiration in 2002 was that FRES, the utility vehicle, would come
into service
from as
early from 2007 and better if we could do it, and the money was
there
because we
had made the money available.”
115.
On 26 June
2003, the DMB considered a “thinkpiece” paper from
Mr Colin
Balmer, MOD
Finance Director, about what strategic guidance the DMB might offer
on
investment
priorities for 2004’s Equipment Programme
(STP/EP04).52
It said
that the
MOD faced
some “difficult choices” in a year where its “financial freedom of
manoeuvre”
would be
“limited”. There would be “no new resources to distribute”, despite
a range of
cost
pressures and new risks emerging.
116.
Mr Balmer
suggested that some areas of the Equipment Programme
represented
“vital
ground” and “should be protected”. Those included network-enabled
capability,
deployable
ISTAR, Combat ID, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical protection
capabilities
and
logistics. He wrote that DMB “might also endorse the need to
re‑examine ISD and
platform
numbers against the DPAs with a view to establishing the effect of
a deferral
… or
reductions”. Amongst others, that review would specifically
consider the FRES
programme.
117.
The Equipment
Programme for 2003 had “continued a shift from quantity to
quality”
and was
consequently “much better balanced” than it had been but
“significant shortfalls”
remained.
It did, however, have “serious” issues of affordability resulting
from “formally
programmed
excesses, unanticipated pressures and industrial factors”.
The current
forecasts
suggested that £4bn would need to be cut from the programme over 10
years
to bring it
in line with the allocated resource. The MOD also needed “to obtain
a better
understanding
of the non‑cash costs of ownership of the growing equipment
programme,
to ensure
that it is affordable in resource terms”.
51
Public
hearing, 28 July 2010, page 58.
52
Paper
Finance Director [MOD], 20 June 2003, ‘Defence Strategic Audit and
Guidance for STP/EP04’.
22