9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
509.
Reporting a
meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad, the Assistant Private
Secretary
recorded
that Mr Browne had observed:
“US demands
on us were somewhat conflicting, with an emerging
expectation
that we
would increase our presence in Afghanistan against a much more
clearly
expressed
desire for us not to reduce our presence in Iraq. The UK’s Armed
Forces
could
simply not do both.”
“… stressed
that any suggestion that UK forces would be augmented or replaced
by
US forces
coming to work in the South was distinctly unhelpful. We could
resolve the
issues that
faced us without indulging in that kind of language which was
likely only
to deepen
any public perception of disagreement.”
511.
In a report to
the FCO of Mr Browne’s visit, Mr Asquith recorded a
similar exchange
with
General Martin Dempsey, Commanding General Multi‑National Security
Transition
Command –
Iraq, and Lt Gen Odierno, who pointed out that “it was awkward if
we
‘unsurged’
while the US surged” and said bluntly that what the US “did not
want was
our
claiming success against the facts on the ground in order to
justify the withdrawal
512.
Mr Browne
“laid out the implications of our requirement to deploy in
Iraq
and Afghanistan”.
513.
Mr Asquith
also reported a meeting between Mr Browne and Prime Minister
Maliki,
who
emphasised that his Government was focused on the Baghdad Security
Plan
and whether
it would have an impact elsewhere in the country. If it did, “a
precipitate
withdrawal
should be avoided to prevent a repetition of past
problems”.
514.
During the
Basra portion of the visit, Mr Browne’s Assistant Private
Secretary
reported
that Maj Gen Shaw said that the delay in the expected timing of
transition to
PIC meant
there was a much greater risk that the UK would still have a
defined security
responsibility
for Basra city after having re‑postured completely outside the
city, leaving
his forces
unable to fulfil that responsibility properly.272
515.
In Maj Gen
Shaw’s view, it would be necessary to maintain “a foot on the
ground”
in Basra
city in order to maintain the ability to strike and so that the
intelligence required
for
operations could be collected.
516.
In his meeting
with senior civilian staff in Basra, Mr Browne was told that
several of
them
considered that the security situation was generally worse for the
ordinary Basrawi
than six
months ago, primarily because of rising intimidation. Intimidation
was also the
271
eGram
4193/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 31 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Defence
Secretary’s Visit to
Baghdad, 30
January’.
272
Minute
McNeil to MA1/DCDS(C), 1 February 2006 [sic], ‘Defence Secretary’s
visit to Iraq –
28‑31
January 2007’.
97