The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

that Sunni/Shia and religious/secular tensions could be exacerbated by the fact of a

predominantly Shia religious government coming into power, with the new Government

set to take early decisions (including on the de-Ba’athification process) which would

confirm a sceptical Sunni audience’s worst fears. Raised political tension and increased

violence risked feeding off each other.

510. On 10 March, at the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq

since Mr Straw became Chair, Mr Straw explained that Mr Blair “had asked a core

group of Ministers to meet on a weekly basis to focus more closely on the delivery of

policy in Iraq”.277

511. The meeting discussed Iraqiisation, the political process, broadening international

engagement and reconstruction. Ministers agreed that the FCO and MOD would

circulate an outline of a possible security strategy announcement by the end of 14 March

and that the FCO would circulate a note on forthcoming international events on Iraq.

They asked the FCO to follow up concerns over the safety of judges, prosecutors and

witnesses in the Iraqi Special Tribunal.

512. On 11 March, Mr Sawers sent Mr Straw a minute covering impressions from his

visit to Iraq.278

513. Mr Sawers wrote that the situation was encouraging, which he attributed to the

“boost” from elections. Politics remained “firmly on a confessional basis”, but:

“… each community is getting organised, good quality people are emerging as chief

negotiators, and they are working for a consensus, building on existing agreements,

above all the TAL.”

514. The Shia list had settled on Dr Ibrahim Ja’afari as its candidate for Prime Minister.

Mr Sawers noted that “the Kurds are the most cohesive group”, and “the Sunni Arabs are

beginning to sort themselves out too”, recognising in some cases that they had missed

out by boycotting the elections. One of the keys to the next phase would be for each of

the four main factions – Shia Islamists, Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Allawi’s secularists –

to be able to negotiate authoritatively on the constitution.

515. Prime Minister Allawi had absented himself from the political negotiations279

and Mr Sawers suggested Mr Blair should call him to encourage him to take part.280

In Mr Sawers’ view, there was a need for a secular force bringing together Shia and

Sunni Arabs, to keep the Shia Islamists in check. He also considered that the Sunni

Islamists were uncomfortably strong.

277 Minutes, 10 March 2005, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq meeting.

278 Minute Sawers to Foreign Secretary, 11 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Impressions’.

279 Telegram 123 Baghdad to FCO London, 1 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Formation of New Government: Allawi

Bows Out’.

280 Minute Sawers to Foreign Secretary, 11 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Impressions’.

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