3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
576.
Sir David and
Dr Rice agreed that everyone knew that the Security Council
would
have to
meet if Dr Blix reported that the Iraqis were in breach; and
that everyone knew
that the
French could table another resolution at that point if they wanted
to. Sir David
told
Dr Rice that “it was important to signal, through the new
resolution, that the Security
Council was
united in its determination to support Blix and bring the maximum
pressure
to bear on
Saddam to disarm. We had to go through this process.”
577.
Mr Powell
asked, “Where does this leave us with the AG [Attorney
General]?”184
578.
Sir David
responded:
“Can’t say
at this stage.
(i) Will
almost certainly be the beginning not the end of the negotiation
with
the
French.
(ii) If we
have a material breach in OP1 with an open OP10 (ie
consultations)
we shall
still be in the same place with the AG as before – at least
I
presume so.
Still better for us to get a pre‑cooked second
resolution.”185
579.
In the second
conversation, Dr Rice told Sir David that the US had agreed to
put
new
language “in play” while ensuring that it remained clear to
everyone that the US
would
insist on safeguarding its freedom to act if the UN would
not.186
580.
Sir David
Manning also wrote to Mr Powell, pursuing the idea that
Mr Blair could
suggest a
private agreement to President Bush on the text of a second
resolution
authorising
“all necessary means”, which the UK would table at the UN Security
Council
“if and
when appropriate”.187
Sir David
thought it “could be a tough sell” but Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
thought it was “possible”. Sir David added: “This would give us
legal cover.”
581.
Mr Powell
marked the minute to Mr Blair “to see”.188
582.
Mr Straw
clearly expected that in response to a breach, a second
resolution
would be
tabled.
583.
In a
conversation with Mr de Villepin on 17 October, Mr Straw
encouraged
France to
accept the US language, including by pointing out that France could
set
out its
interpretation in an explanation of its vote, “consider” was an
active verb
implying a
subsequent decision, and a two stage approach would be
required.
184
Manuscript
comment Powell to Manning on Letter Manning to McDonald, 16 October
2002,
‘Iraq: Conversation
with Condi Rice’.
185
Manuscript
comment Manning to Powell, 16 October 2002, on Letter Manning to
McDonald,
16 October
2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.
186
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
187
Minute
Manning to Powell, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: The Second Resolution
Dilemma’.
188
Manuscript
comment Powell to PM on Minute Manning to Powell, 16 October 2002,
‘Iraq: The Second
Resolution
Dilemma’.
305