9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
“The main …
question is what are US plans for the MNF Mission in the South? At
a
high level
they want to help the Iraqis counter the militias, disrupt Iranian
influence
and extend
Iraqi Government control. But we will need to be clear what we
are
getting in
to, and guard against two strategic risks:
(a) That
MNF gets dragged into intra-Shia rivalries …
(b) That we
become embroiled in an escalating Iranian confrontation.
Events
in Basra
have greatly increased Iraqi perceptions of the threat posed
by
Iran’s
sponsorship of JAM … We are less convinced … that the
Iranians
can control
JAM, and … judge that Iran’s role in the crisis was
primarily
one of
observer and mediator. We judge that Iran is trying to limit
intra-Shia
violence
…
“Whatever
the plan, we will see a more active US role, and renegotiation of
UK tasks
in MND(SE).
We have three broad military options:
(i)
Step-up: seek to take full responsibility for delivering emerging
plans for
MND(SE),
reversing our troop drawdown.
(ii) Steady
state: remain with existing force levels and negotiate a new set
of
tasks with
the US …
(iii)
Withdrawal: take the opportunity provided by the changed
circumstance to
accelerate
our withdrawal from Basra before November.
“Much
depends on US attitudes, which are conditional on whether the
situation in
Basra
stabilises …
“A US team
will arrive in Basra in the next few days to step up reconstruction
efforts.
Presentationally,
the US effort risks overshadowing UK economic initiatives
…
“We will
need to ensure our projects are co-ordinated and
complementary.
Experience
over the past five years in such projects is that they provide
short term
benefits,
but are often not sustainable … Our message to the US will need to
be that
such work
takes time.”
995.
Dr Turner
provided Mr Brown with “a narrative stressing what we have
achieved –
and still
hope to achieve – on military training, political reconciliation
and economic
reconstruction”.
He advised:
“Publicly
we will need to reinforce the principles of your 8 October
statement:
we will
fulfil our obligations in Iraq as long as we are there at the
invitation of the
Government
of Iraq and the international community …
“In
private, we will also need to keep reminding the US of our legal
constraints, once
the UNSCR
lapses …”
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