9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
Unless
efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during
… the
coming 12
to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will
continue
to deteriorate
at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006.”
503.
The assessment
pointed to a number of factors that were driving the
violence:
•
Shia
insecurity about loosening their hold on power, born of “decades
of
subordination
to Sunni … domination”;
•
many Sunni
Arabs being “unwilling to accept their minority status” and
being
“convinced
that Shia dominance will increase Iranian influence over Iraq, in
ways
that erode
the State’s Arab character”;
•
the “absence
of unifying leaders among the Arab Sunni or Shia with the
capacity
to speak
for or exert control over their confessional groups”;
•
the fact
that the Kurds, while willing to participate in Iraqi
state‑building, were
reluctant
to surrender any of their autonomy and seeking to increase
their
control of
Kirkuk;
•
the ISF’s
inability to operate independently against the Shia militias with
any
success,
and the sectarian divisions within many units;
•
the
presence of extremists – in particular AQ-I, whose members acted as
a
“very effective
accelerators for what has become a self‑sustaining
inter‑sectarian
struggle
between Shia and Sunnis”; and
•
significant
population displacement – the UN estimated by this stage that
there
were over a
million Iraqis in Syria and Jordan.
504.
Although the
US intelligence community did not consider that the term “civil
war”
adequately
captured the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, it considered that
that phrase
was an
accurate description of key elements of the violence. It
judged:
“Coalition
capabilities, including force levels, resources and
operations,
remain an
essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If coalition
forces were withdrawn
rapidly
during … [the next 12‑18 months] we judge that this almost
certainly would
lead to a
significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict
in Iraq,
intensify
Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse
consequences
for
national reconciliation.
“If such a
rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would
be
unlikely to
survive as a non‑sectarian national institution; neighbouring
countries –
invited by
Iraqi factions or unilaterally – might intervene openly in the
conflict;
massive
civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be
probable;
AQ‑I would
attempt to use parts of the country – particularly al‑Anbar
province – to
plan
increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiralling violence
and political
disarray in
Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and
strengthen
autonomy,
could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.”
95