The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
185.
Mr Sawers
reported on 20 June that plans were in train to pay more
generous
severance
payments and a monthly stipend for those with at least 15 years’
service who
were not
senior Ba’athists.149
Mr Sawers’
own view was that the sums being proposed
“may not be
enough to solve the problem”, adding:
“Bremer has
an open mind on this, though does not want to burden a future
Iraqi
Government
more than necessary, nor be more generous to ex‑soldiers than
to
civilians …
At a meeting with leading Iraqis today Bremer sought views on
how
to deal
with the ex‑military. The great majority of those present –
including Shia
Islamists –
argued that regular payments should be made to ease the security
threat
that the
ex‑military would pose if they were marginalised.”
186.
Payments for
ex‑servicemen were announced on 23 June.150
187.
Ms Ann
Clwyd, the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to Iraq on Human Rights
from
2003 to
2009, told the Inquiry that “many people slipped through the net …
senior
people, who
could have been used in those early stages to help the
Coalition”.151
She
recounted a
meeting with a senior army officer who had queued for his stipend
for
two weeks
without reaching the front of the queue. He had told her: “if they
want to
humiliate us,
this is the way of doing it”.
188.
Major General
Freddie Viggers, who arrived in Baghdad in May 2003 as
SBMR‑I,
described
similar scenes:
“I can
remember going with Walt Slocombe in to see Paul Bremer and saying
‘this
has got to
stop. The numbers at the gate now are over 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, and
we
have to
start giving these people a little bit of respect and the means to
live on’.” 152
189.
Sir David
Manning visited Baghdad and Basra in May. A substantial part of
his
report to
Mr Blair (described in Section 9.2) dealt with policing and
security, and the way
in which
the UK could contribute to restoring order in the Iraqi capital. He
reported to
Mr Blair
that: “Baghdad remains key; and the key to Baghdad is
security.”153
Sir David’s
view was
that:
“Police
training could have a disproportionate impact. (Police are
conspicuous by
their
absence). A quick win would be moving 16 Air Assault Brigade to
Baghdad with
the task of
providing police training for six weeks.”
149
Telegram 46
IraqRep to FCO London, 20 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Payments to
Ex‑Military, and Preparations
for the New
Army’.
150
CPA Press
Notice, 23 June 2003, ‘Good News for Iraqi Soldiers’.
151
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 26‑27.
152
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 29.
153
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 22 May 2003, ‘Iraq – Visit to Baghdad
and Basra’.
100