The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
289.
Sir Jeremy
recommended that in the Security Council meeting on
14 February,
the UK should seek to draw out the truth about
non-co-operation.
290.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that he had told Dr Blix on 12 February
that an
ultimatum
remained an option and that they had discussed how to create a
concrete
ultimatum
which required Iraqi co-operation on substance.81
291.
Sir Jeremy had
set out the UK position that:
“… pushing
for reinforced inspections was a mistake. The Security Council
needed
to realise
that Saddam was in denial of 1441 and there had to be a firm
decision that
he either
gave up his WMD or left Iraq, or faced military
action.”
292.
In response to
Dr Blix’s questions about the issue coming to a head after
only two
and a half
months and the timing of military action, Sir Jeremy had replied
that, “more
than the
climate”, the “US was worried about losing backing and momentum and
saw
only one
way to deal with Iraqi non-co-operation. That was why we were
running out of
time”. He
had “added” that he had “always felt that the best way to keep the
UN together
was through
a WMD find which demonstrated the Iraqi lie”. In Sir Jeremy’s view,
“by
distracting
from the main issue of Iraqi co-operation and giving the Iraqis
false hope,
the French
ideas could make war more likely”.
293.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Dr Blix had also raised the possibility of using
UNMOVIC
expertise
in a post-war scenario.
294.
Commenting on
the conversation, Sir Jeremy reported that Dr Blix
“genuinely
believes
that inspections still have something to contribute, but could not
claim that
he had
acquired anything of substance out of the recent period”.
Dr Blix was:
“… torn
between time for more peaceful disarmament through inspections
and
helping to
pile on the pressure to make the Iraqis crack. He would have
been
more inclined
to follow the latter course if he felt less certain that the
Americans
were hell-bent
on war anyway.”
295.
Sir Jeremy
suggested that Mr Straw should use his intervention in the
Council
meeting on
14 February to pose questions for Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei “that draw out
the
non-co-operation truths”.
296.
Mr Blair
told the House of Commons on 12 February that the
Security
Council
should be the judge of whether there was full and complete
co-operation
from Iraq
with the inspectors.
81
Telegram
247 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Conversation with Dr Blix’.
232