14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)

885.  Gen Jackson visited Iraq from 12 to 15 September.467 His report to General

Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), stated that the Coalition was

finding it difficult to “obtain a cohesive picture” of the various threats it was tackling.

He wrote that he believed it was “time to reprioritise some of our intelligence

gathering assets”.

886.  Gen Jackson recommended switching the focus of in‑theatre intelligence

gathering assets from weapons of mass destruction to counter‑terrorism.

887.  On 1 October, the DMB endorsed a paper from Mr Ian Andrews, MOD Second

Permanent Under Secretary, that identified potential savings of £300m across the DLO

and DPA.468 That is described earlier in this Section in the context of savings made

against FRES.

888.  ISTAR was also an area identified for savings and included:

• £4m to delay the practical experimentation of UAVs by six months, which would

delay the “de‑risking activity necessary to inform Watchkeeper and other ISTAR

and network-enabled capability related programmes”; and

• delaying the Watchkeeper Assessment Phase, due to be concluded in

April 2004, by six months. The interim operating capabililty would consequently

be delayed by a year to 2007.

889.  On 6 October, Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary wrote to No.10, confirming

that Mr Hoon would be implementing £500m of savings across the Defence budget

and where some of those savings would fall.469 He highlighted that the MOD

would delay ISDs for “new equipments such as the Watchkeeper (a key SDR New

Chapter capability)”.

890.  Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary wrote:

“These measures would not directly impact on the operations in Iraq, but would

begin to cut into the training and support needed for motivated Armed Forces

capable of sustaining the operations there, especially if the situation on the ground

escalated, or in responding to new crises.”

891.  Maj Gen Lamb’s post‑operation report on 30 January 2004 stated that, in October

2003, the Joint Helicopter Force (Iraq) (JHF‑I) was “augmented by three Gazelle and

two Puma for ISTAR operations”.470

467  Minute CGS to CDS, 17 September 2003, ‘CGS visit to Op TELIC 12‑15 Sep 03’.

468  Minutes, 1 October 2003, Defence Management Board meeting; Paper 2nd PUS, 30 September 2003,

‘In‑Year Management: AP03 update’.

469  Letter Davies to Heywood, 6 October 2003, ‘Ministry of Defence Budget’.

470  Report Lamb, 30 January 2004, ‘Post Operation Report – version 1 Operation TELIC 2/3’.

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