The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
116.
On 31 January,
in advance of the first meeting of the US/UK/Australia
Working
Group on
Day After Economic on 5 February, a junior official in the British
Embassy
Washington
advised the FCO that, on oil, “at present, the [US] Administration
are
sharing
little with us”.62
Much of the
post-conflict planning relating to oil was being done
within the
DoD. The official US line was that UK concerns about transparency
and the
need for a
level commercial playing field had been taken on
board.
117.
The official
reported that Mr Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, had
said
publicly
that oil would be held “in trust” for the Iraqi people and that the
underlying
US objective
was to get operations back into the hands of the “local workforce”,
but that
view might
not be held in other (unspecified) parts of the US
Administration.
118.
The official
also reported that rumours persisted that contracts had already
been
let for the
initial clean-up phase (which could last anything from two to 18
months).
119.
The official
concluded that key questions remained, including who would be
in
overall
charge of the oil sector after the initial clean-up.
120.
Mr Blair
met President Bush and Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s
National
Security
Advisor, in Washington on 31 January to discuss post-conflict
planning.
121.
A FCO briefing
for Mr Blair included in its list of objectives for the
meeting:
“To
convince President Bush … the US needs to pay much more attention,
quickly,
to planning
on ‘day after’ issues; and that the UN needs to be central to
it.”63
Key
messages included:
•
The UN
could bring “significant advantages” after the conflict, including
taking
on
responsibility for oil revenues “to avoid accusations that aim of
military action
was to get
control of oil”.
•
Restoring
oil production would be “an immediate challenge”. The oil
sector
would need
“some technology and a lot of capital”. The US and UK
should
“encourage
an open investment regime and a level playing field for
foreign
companies”.
122.
A short
Cabinet Office paper offered Mr Blair a “few OD Sec points,
just in case
they slip
through the briefing”.64
Those
included:
•
the
importance of the transparent use of oil revenues; and
•
the need to
argue for a level playing field for UK companies on new
oil
exploration
contracts.
62
Letter FCO
[junior official] to FCO [junior official], 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq
‘Day After’; Economic Working
Group’.
63
Paper FCO,
30 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Camp David, 31 January:
Iraq’.
64
Minute
Drummond to Rycroft, 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq: US
Visit’.
392