The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
insisted
“on the importance of working towards a consensus position” on
future
action with
respect to Iraq; and
•
urged
members of the Security Council “to work with greater
creativity”
on the issue.
1105.
Secretary
Powell stated that the Security Council had “one very, very
important
question”
of intent to address: “Has the Iraqi regime made the fundamental
strategic and
political
decision to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions
and to rid
itself of
all of its weapons of mass destruction and the infrastructure for
the development
of weapons
of mass destruction?” It was not a question of “clusters of
unanswered
questions”
or benchmarks, but of whether Iraq had made the choice actively
to
co‑operate.
In his view, the presentations by Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei had been “a
catalogue
of non-co-operation”. Iraq’s “initiatives” were only small steps,
which had been
“taken only
grudgingly; rarely unconditionally; and primarily under the threat
of force”.
1106.
Secretary
Powell argued that the inspectors should not need more resources
to
look for
prohibited facilities. That showed Iraq was not co-operating. The
Council “must
not allow
Iraq to shift the burden of proof onto the inspectors”. Nor could
the Council
“return to
the failed bargain of resolution 1284 (1999), which offered partial
relief for
partial
disclosure”. Iraq had to be held to the terms of resolution 1441,
which required
“full and
immediate compliance”.
1107.
Secretary
Powell stated that progress was “often more apparent than
real”.
Missiles
were being destroyed but Iraq had the infrastructure to make more,
which
had not
yet been identified and destroyed.
1108.
In the light
of events in 1991, when the IAEA had mistakenly been about
to
determine
Iraq did not have a nuclear programme, Secretary Powell urged
caution
in relation
to Dr ElBaradei’s report, citing further information calling
into question the
conclusion
that the aluminium tubes were for unguided rockets.
1109.
Secretary
Powell welcomed UNMOVIC’s “compilation of outstanding
issues”
which added
up to “a damning record of 12 years of lies, deception and failure
to
come clean
on the part of Iraq”. Iraq had lied to previous inspectors and
planted
false
evidence. The US view was that those activities were “still
ongoing”. In 1998,
when faced
with the threat of military action, Iraq had made promises, but had
not
delivered.
In Secretary Powell’s view, that position had not changed and the
UNMOVIC
document revealed:
“… a
strategic decision to delay, to deceive, to try to throw us off the
trail … to hope
that the
will of the international community will be fractured
…”
1110.
Secretary
Powell stated that the Iraqi regime had not taken the decision to
disarm.
The
Security Council “must not walk away”. If it failed to meet its
responsibilities, “the
credibility
of the Council and its ability to deal with all the critical
challenges we face will
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