The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“All our
experience of him teaches us that it is sometimes hard to succeed
with him
via
diplomacy, but one thing is for sure: diplomacy stands no chance of
success at all
unless he
knows that if he fails to listen to reason, we have the force to
back it up.” 175
In his
press conference on 20 December 1998, Mr Blair
said:
“… the
patience of the international community cannot be tried
indefinitely … when
it is right
and when the will of the international community is at stake we
will act to
enforce it
because the first stirrings of a new global reality are upon us.
Those who
abuse force
to wage war must be confronted by those willing to use force to
maintain
peace,
otherwise the simple truth is that war becomes more likely. We
cannot do
everything,
that is true, but what we can do reasonably we
should do.” 176
443.
Lord Wilson of
Dinton, Cabinet Secretary from 1998 to 2002, told the Inquiry
that
between
January 1998 and January 1999 he had attended and noted 21
Ministerial
discussions
on Iraq; 10 in Cabinet, of which seven had “some substance”; five
in the
Defence and
Overseas Policy Committee (DOP); and six ad hoc meetings,
including
444.
Iraq was
discussed in one of Lord Wilson’s first Cabinet meetings on
28 January
1998.178
Lord Wilson
recalled that Mr Cook told his colleagues things which
were
“entirely
recognisable four or five years later”, namely:
“… a
serious situation is building; we would be ready to use force if
necessary,
because not
being ready to use force would undermine our leverage over
Saddam
Hussein;
and thirdly, the United States were clear that they had legal
authority to
take action
whereas our legal advice was more nuanced.”
445.
Lord Wilson
commented that those points could be transposed to March
2002.
446.
The Cabinet
Office has informed the Inquiry that there was no discussion of
Iraq in
DOP in 1999
or 2000, and that the four discussions in Cabinet in early 1999
(the last on
7 March)
were confined to brief updates on the NFZs. There is no record of
any Cabinet
discussion
of Iraq in 2000.179
447.
In a joint
press conference with Dr Albright on 31 January 1998,
Mr Cook said:
“No option
is ruled out but the best prospect of us achieving a solution by
diplomatic
measures is
to leave Saddam Hussein in no doubt about our resolve to win
this
struggle
and no doubt in his mind that all options are open to
us.”180
175
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, page 43.
176
Transcript
of Press conference by Mr Blair, 20 December
1998.
177
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, page 11.
178
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 73-74.
179
Email
Cabinet Office to Aldred, 5 July 2011, ‘FOI request for joint
MOD/FCO memo on Iraq
Policy 1999’.
180
House of
Commons Library Research Paper 98/28, 16 February 1998, ‘The
Iraq Crisis’.
104