The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
176.
Maj Gen Shaw’s
account of the discussion said that Gen Petraeus’ key
concern
was the
timing and method of withdrawal from Basra Palace, commenting “it
must
177.
Maj Gen Shaw’s
judgement was that the threat to the Palace was low and
the
Palace
Protection Force would be ready to take over responsibility at the
end of the
month. He
continued:
“But I
detect an increasing chorus of demands for certainty, for an
absence of risk.
Let me be
explicit – there is no risk-free option. If we go as planned at the
end of
the month,
we are dependent upon Iraqis both within friendly and enemy forces
for
success –
they have a vote. This is battle space and it is impossible to
prove the
negative
that nothing will go wrong if we hand over. And if we stay, there
will be the
risk of
more deaths. I am working to, and my successor will execute, the
plan to
leave by
the end of the month.”
178.
Maj Gen Shaw
also reported that the projected date for PIC in Basra had
been
deferred
again, to a likely announcement in October followed by PIC in
November.
Maj Gen
Shaw observed that this had implications for the proposed
Parliamentary
statement
by Mr Brown in early October, which would be much easier if it
followed an
announcement
about PIC. He reported, “General Petraeus acknowledges that in the
end
politics
will overcome conditionality”.
179.
On 9 August,
an official in the MOD asked Mr Browne to agree that the
release of
the four
detainees identified by JAM1 could proceed.78
They
explained that after “some
initial
reluctance” Gen Petraeus had agreed, as did Gen Mohan and Dr
Rubaie.
“As this is
the only currently available plan to try and trigger a step change
in the
security
dynamics in Basra, there is a good case for proceeding: there is no
way
radically
to change the position on the ground without accepting some
risks.”
181.
Mr Browne’s
Private Secretary responded the following day to say that
Mr Browne
agreed that
the releases should proceed.79
182.
On 10 August,
a senior government official specialising in the Middle
East
(1) wrote
to the FCO Director General Defence and Intelligence with an update
on
negotiations
with JAM1.80
The advice
was copied to Mr Bowen, Lieutenant General
Peter Wall
(Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments)), Mr McDonald
and
Ms Margaret Aldred
(Deputy Head of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat).
77
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 9 August 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 09
August 2007’.
78
Minute
Vincent to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 9 August 2007,
‘Negotiations with Jaysh al Mehdi (JAM)
in
Basra’.
79
Minute
Forber to CJV-AD Pol1, 10 August 2007, ‘Negotiations with Jaysh al
Mehdi (JAM) in Basra’.
80
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Leslie, 10 August 2007, ‘[NAME
OF
OPERATION]: update on negotiations with JAM in
Basrah’.
216