The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
15.
The Private
Secretary reported concern within the military “that the UK
Battlegroup
deployed in
Maysan province, primarily to cover the huge border with Iran, is
not
achieving
any military effect”. Officials were working on a paper “on the
issues
around (and
implications of) moving out of the Basra Palace site, and
security
transition in
the South”.
16.
At Cabinet on
29 June, Mr Browne described three separate incidents
involving
British
forces in Basra the previous day and observed that British forces
were facing
the brunt
of violence in South-East Iraq.5
Cabinet
expressed sympathy for the soldiers
and their
families.
17.
Mr Dominic
Asquith, British Ambassador to Iraq, reported on 29 June that
Sunni
distrust of
the political process was becoming increasingly focused on Prime
Minister
Maliki
personally.6
Despite
this “atmosphere of mistrust”, discussions were
continuing
among the
parties on restructuring the government around an Executive
Council
(consisting
of the President, two Vice Presidents and the Prime Minister) and
a
moderate
front involving five partners.7
18.
Mr Asquith
noted that there was a disconnect between the US and Iraqi
approaches
to the
political process. Iraqis were arguing that the parties needed time
to build trust
while the
US saw that process halting progress towards achieving their most
pressing
benchmarks:
political agreement to the draft Hydrocarbons Law8
and revenue
sharing
arrangements.
Mr Asquith commented:
“Managing
this disconnect will require maintaining the focus on discrete
elements of
the
programme that might be salvageable:
•
the
benchmark legislation, including a return to the de-Ba’athification
draft,
which I
shall be discussing further with the Americans;
•
the
constitutional review, on which we are in discussion with the
CRC
[Constitutional
Review Committee] chairs …;
•
continuing
the schedule of Executive Council meetings with the aim
of
securing
agreement at least on how it will operate;
•
proceeding
with preparations for provincial elections.”
5
Cabinet
Conclusions, 29 June 2007.
6
eGram
28011/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 29 June 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly
Assessment’.
7
The Kurdish
PUK and KDP, the Shia Dawa and ISCI and the Sunni IIP.
8
This would
describe the governance and development of the energy sector in
Iraq.
184