The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
194.
Mr Webb
also advised that Iraq’s nuclear programme could move
forward
more
quickly if it obtained fissile material from abroad.
195.
Mr Webb,
offered advice on the UK approach in response to President
Bush’s
“axis of
evil”’ speech to Mr Hoon on 27 February (see Section
6.1).95
196.
Mr Webb
recommended that the UK should:
•
acknowledge
that the three countries identified by President Bush
posed
increasing
risks to international stability; and
•
persuade
the US to explain why, releasing intelligence in a “road
show”.
197.
Mr Webb
also proposed adding Libya to the list of countries of
concern.
198.
Mr Webb
sent Mr Hoon summaries of material on WMD programmes which
might
be released
to European allies and informed him that the JIC was “working
further on a
public
version”.
199.
In relation to
Iraq, Mr Webb wrote:
“Iraq came
close to developing nuclear weapons before the Gulf War, with
medium
range
missiles. The containment policy since then halted her nuclear
progress,
eg by
UN inspection regimes and bombing in 1998. But Saddam has kept
trying:
we do not
currently assess him as having succeeded but the high level of
technical
capacity
that Iraq has sustained means that they could move forward
quickly,
especially
if Saddam could lay his hands on fissile material.”
200.
Mr Webb
added that some of the programmes could be explained:
“… in
regional terms: Iran and Iraq in particular respond to each other’s
fears.
But once
the capability exists, it will pose risks not just to each other
but to the
wider region.”
201.
Mr Webb
also identified the potential risks to deployed forces and UK bases
such
as Cyprus,
as well as the more general interest in stemming the tide of
proliferation by
using
non-military and military options.
202.
In the context
of using international diplomatic pressure to control the
proliferation
of WMD,
Mr Webb described Saddam Hussein as “the strategic centre of
gravity of Iraqi
WMD
programmes”. He added that “unless we tackle some of those cheating
on their
treaty
obligations, the rest of the WMD regime will crumble”.
203.
The
information sent to Mr Hoon about Iraq’s ballistic missile and
biological warfare
programmes
reflected the JIC Assessments.
95
Letter Webb
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 27 February 2002, ‘Axis of
Evil’.
50