The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
622.
In the South,
Dr Reid met Maj Gen Cooper who:
“… noted
that corruption and intimidation were on the rise as was the murder
rate.
Basra City
was becoming a ‘criminal kingdom’. Outside this however there
were
hopeful
signs, with Muthanna progressing very well towards
handover.”
623.
Dr Reid then
visited Muthanna, where his Assistant Private Secretary
recorded
that:
“The clear
impression from commanders and troops alike was that the job …
was
largely
done and that the Iraqi security forces there were ready and able
to take on
the
task.”
624.
In preparation
for a video conference with President Bush, on 21
March
Mr Phillipson
told Mr Blair that:
“The
security situation remains difficult. Since the Samarra bombing,
[the] number of
murders has
more than doubled to around 28 per day, with a significant
proportion
‘execution
style’. It’s impossible to say how many of these are ‘sectarian’,
but there
is wider
evidence – internal refugees, obvious and active militias – which
suggest
[sic] an
upsurge in strictly sectarian violence. But it is not a civil
war, and the sort
of
escalation of combat activity that would be needed to justify that
description is
625.
Mr Blair
and President Bush did not discuss sectarian violence in their
video
conference
on the same day.301
626.
Mr Blair
said that it would be important to have a clear communications
strategy
for the
immediate aftermath of the formation of a new Iraqi Government.
Iraqi politicians
would need
to stress that they were part of a national unity government and
that they
welcomed
the presence of the MNF. A programme setting out what work the
US/UK and
Iraqis
would do to take forward security and reconstruction should then be
developed
rapidly.
627.
At Cabinet on
23 March, Dr Reid reported that there was a growing
sectarian
divide in
Iraq, with increasing militia and sectarian
killings.302
Much of it
was based
on
deliberate provocation from Al Qaida-associated terrorists, many of
whom were
foreigners,
or supporters of the former regime who were massacring Iraqi Shia
and
attacking
their holy sites. In response, the Shia were beginning to kill
Sunnis, many of
whom were
not associated with the violence. Dr Reid did not believe, however,
that
the violence
constituted a civil war. That was also the view of every Iraqi
politician he
had
met.
300
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 21 March 2006, ‘VTC with President
Bush, 1335 21 March 2006’.
301
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 21 March 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 21 March:
Middle East
issues’.
302
Cabinet
Conclusions, 23 March 2006.
592