3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
inspectors
had reported in unequivocal terms that Iraq was complying with
1441.
Resolution
1441 was the means of enabling Saddam to say ‘yes’. But we could
only
resolve
this peacefully with the threat of military
action.”307
903.
In his
statement for the Inquiry, Sir Jeremy Greenstock
wrote:
“The UK …
was interested in ending the threat from Iraq of the use of WMD
against
UK
interests. If this could be done by a successful and effective UN
regime of
intrusive
inspections, this was preferable to a war.”308
904.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told the Inquiry:
“UK
strategy was influenced by two principal factors: the need to
research every
possible
angle for the disarmament of Iraq through means short of the use of
actual
force; and
the need to establish with the greatest international consensus
the
justification
for the use of force, if force in the end proved necessary. This
meant
… that the
UN inspectors had to return to Iraq to establish in detail whether
or not
Saddam
Hussein was complying with UN resolutions, under conditions that
both
attracted
support within the Security Council and gave the inspectors a real
chance
of
achieving something useful.”309
905.
In his
statement for the Inquiry, Sir Jeremy Greenstock
wrote:
“The US …
was keen to impose terms on Saddam Hussein which made the
case
for military
measures unquestionable if he did not fulfil them. There was
therefore
an American
interest in setting the bar very high for Iraq.”310
“The UK, on
the other hand, was interested in ending the threat from Iraq from
the
use of WMD
against UK interests. This could be done by a successful and
effective
UN regime
of intrusive inspections, this was preferable to a
war.”
907.
Sir Jeremy
wrote that it was the expectation of many Member States that
there
would be a
Security Council decision before force was used:
“Most
members of the Council, however, made an assumption that
further
discussion
in the Security Council about Iraqi compliance would itself lead to
a
decision
for or against the use of force. In public explanations of vote
after 1441 was
adopted,
only Mexico was absolutely explicit that this was their
expectation. France
and Russia
were not so explicit, which implied to me that they recognised that
1441
did not
amount unambiguously to such a condition.”311
307
Straw
J. Last Man
Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan,
2012.
308
Statement,
November 2009, page 7.
309
Statement,
November 2009, page 9.
310
Statement,
November 2009, page 7.
311
Statement,
November 2009, page 11.
361