The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
we would
try”; and that he had said: “As I see it, the issue of the second
resolution is
how best to
help our friends.”
923.
Vice President
Cheney wrote that Mr Blair had “returned to Washington at the
end
of January”
to argue that “we needed yet another resolution”; and that he,
Secretary
Powell,
Mr Rumsfeld and Dr Rice:
“… were all
in agreement that this was a mistake. We’d managed one
resolution,
no one
believed we needed a second, and it would be very hard to get
…
“I also
thought that going to the UN again would make us look hesitant and
uncertain,
but Blair
saw a second resolution as a political necessity for him at
home …
“Britain
was our major ally and when the President decided to try for a
second
resolution,
I understood his reasons.”299
924.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry that the main objective of his meeting with
President
Bush on 31
January had been to secure US agreement to a second resolution
for
political
reasons.
925.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry that the main objective of the meeting on 31
January was
to convince
President Bush that it was necessary to get a second
resolution.300
That
“was
obviously going to make life a lot easier politically in every
respect”. Mr Blair added:
“we took
the view that that was not necessary, but, obviously, politically,
it would have
been far
easier”. The American concern was that “they’d get pulled into a UN
process,
you’d never
get to a proper decision and then you’d never get the closure of
the issue
in the
way that you should”.
926.
Asked about
President Bush’s view of the need for a second resolution,
Mr Blair
told the
Inquiry:
“President
Bush’s view, and the view of the entire American system was
that,
by that time,
Saddam had been given the opportunity to comply …
“… he
hadn’t taken it. Indeed, what we now know is that he was continuing
to act
in breach
of the UN resolutions even after the inspectors got back in
there.
“So … the
American view throughout had been … ‘This leopard isn’t going to
change
his spots.
He is always going to be difficult.’ So … their concern … that
they’d get
pulled into
a UN process, you’d never get to a proper decision and then you’d
never
get the
closure of the issue in a way that you should.
“The
problem … from our perspective, was that … we wanted to carry on
going
down the UN
route, but the Americans had taken the view – and in a sense
we
299
Cheney D
& Cheney L. In My Time:
A Personal and Political Memoir. Simon &
Schuster, 2011.
300
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 95‑96.
168