9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Blair wrote:
“The shift
from ORHA to the CPA was not controversial, neither was the
appointment
of
Ambassador Bremer. I do not recall exactly when both were decided.
It was widely
accepted
that ORHA, at the beginning, was not geared up to the task. Bremer
was,
in my view,
a very effective operator and given the scale of the task, the CPA
made
considerable
strides forward.
“I do not
accept there were differing assumptions between the US and the UK
about
the three
stage plan for the aftermath: military government; transition to
civilian
led
administration; and then to a proper Iraqi Government. There was a
difference
over the UN
role that was debated and decided. Inevitably, it was impossible to
pin
down the
precise details of how and more important when, each stage of
transition
would
occur, until we were in and could judge according to the reality.
But the basic
principles
of transition were agreed and actually, in the event,
implemented.”219
344.
When Chief
Constable Paul Kernaghan220
visited
Baghdad and Basra between
13 and 20
May he observed that in the UK’s Area of Responsibility nearly all
buildings
used by the
criminal justice system had been destroyed. CC Kernaghan’s
assessment
of the
damage was:
“Looting
does not do justice to the level of destruction inflicted and I can
best liken
the outcome
to the progress of locusts across a field of corn.”221
345.
In a telegram
sent on 14 May, Mr Sawers reported that the Iraqi
Leadership
Group had
expanded.222
It was
being pressed by the UK and US to grow further and
to agree
that an Interim Authority would be chosen by a National Conference
at which
there would
be representatives of all parties, professions and ethnic groups
alongside
“strong women’s
representation”.
346.
On 18 May, Mr
Segar reported from the British Office in Baghdad
that:
“Looting
continues. In recent days the Interior and Information Ministries
have been
revisited
by looters …
“Nights in
Baghdad are regularly punctuated by the sound of gunfire, but in
the
daytime
shooting is sporadic and people have returned to the streets to
shop and
219
Statement,
14 January 2011, pages 17-18.
220
CC
Kernaghan had lead responsibility for international policing
missions within the Association of Chief
Police
Officers of England and Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO). His
findings in relation to Security
Sector
Reform are covered in Section 12.1.
221
Report
Kernaghan to Blunkett, 23 May 2003, ‘Iraq – visit by Chief
Constable PR Kernaghan’.
222
Telegram 9
IraqRep to FCO London, 14 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Political Process
towards an Interim Authority’.
223
Telegram
029 Baghdad to FCO London, 18 May 2003, ‘Baghdad
Today’.
191