3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
432.
Mr Aldouri
pointed out that there was an “Arabic proverb that an empty
hand
has nothing
to give. You cannot give what you do not have. If we do not possess
such
weapons,
how can we disarm ourselves? How can such weapons be dismantled if
they
do not
exist?”
433.
Iraq agreed
that the “best way to resolve these issues is through
continuing
pro‑active
co-operation with the inspectors”. Mr Aldouri stressed that
Iraq had:
“… chosen
the path of peace. We have opted for solutions that would satisfy
the
international
community. We are prepared to provide all means to assist in
making
clear the
true picture …
“We hope
the Security Council will heed the desire of the vast majority of
States
Members of
the United Nations and allow the inspectors to fulfil their role
…”
434.
In the
subsequent private discussion, Mr Straw stated that there
was
overwhelming
evidence that Iraq had had WMD; if there was no evidence to
show
that it had
been destroyed, we had to work on the basis that it
existed.
435.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that, in response to points raised during
the
private
session of the Council:
•
Dr Blix
had clarified that it was too soon to say whether Iraq had come to
a
genuine
acceptance of the disarmament required – there were some signs
but
no break
through. Interviews were a mixed bag. In reality, the inspectors
had
had no one
accept their conditions, though some people they had asked
had
subsequently
come back and accepted. The Iraqi decree on WMD did not
say
anything
about what Iraq would do in practice. UNMOVIC had expanded
as
much as it
could; if it expanded too fast, there was a risk of
mistakes.
•
Dr ElBaradei
had voiced concerns about Iraq’s approach to
interviews
and
emphasised the importance of inspections as the cornerstone of
the
international
disarmament regime. He had also questioned whether Iraq
needed
reassurance
that a new item would not be regarded as a material
breach.
•
Mr Straw
had stated that the reason that the Council had said Iraq’s WMD
posed
a threat
was because there was overwhelming evidence that Iraq had had
the
material.
If we had no evidence it had been destroyed, we had to work on
the
basis that
it existed and that there was a danger to the region and to our
national
security.
Oral cross-examination was the best way to get the truth.
Interviewees
were not
saying anything and were insisting on tape recorders because
they
wanted to
stay alive. Until Iraq allowed interviews outside Iraq and in
free
conditions,
we would be naive to think that they were
co-operating.
257