9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
international
community’s approach. But it did drive the Shia further toward
Iranian
influence
and prolong the presence of the MNF.
“The Sunnis
had made a mistake in not taking part in January’s elections.
We
welcomed
the recent change of mood. We wanted full participation in
December’s
elections,
leading to an effective and representative government.
“We wanted
the Sunni leadership to commit to: encouraging participation in
the
political
process; reducing violence before the elections and sustaining the
calm
after the
elections; removing foreign fighters; and using their influence to
release
hostages
and end the practice of kidnapping, which did grave damage to
Iraq’s
reputation.
In return we were prepared to discuss transition (though this
would
remain
conditions based – we would not leave a security vacuum), MNF
tactics,
de‑Ba’athification
and detainee releases.
“The Prime
Minister was committed to taking forward this dialogue, which he
had
discussed
with President Bush. Bush was aware of these meetings. In
summary,
we wanted
to develop a shared, balanced agenda with Sunni
leaders.”
467.
Following Sir
Nigel Sheinwald’s meetings, Mr Blair asked officials to keep
in touch
with those
he had spoken to and to consider whether Sir Nigel should have a
further
series of
meetings in early 2006.219
468.
Mr Blair
also asked Mr Patey and Lt Gen Houghton to relay specific
messages
to their US
interlocutors on the need for the MNF to give the Sunnis space
before the
elections;
to work for local cease-fires and avoid major offensive operations
afterwards;
and to look
at some detainee cases with a view to early release if the names
given to
Sir Nigel
presented no significant security threat.
469.
The British
Embassy Baghdad, in concert with the US, called on Sunni
Arab
interlocutors
to halt attacks on the MNF and on Iraqi Security Forces over the
period of
the
December 2005 Iraqi elections.220
470.
Gen Casey
promised to suspend major operations during the elections; in
return,
the
National Consensus Front called on 12 December for jihadists and
insurgents to
cease
operations between 13 and 18 December. There were two significant
releases
of detainees.
471.
On 12
December, Major General James Dutton, GOC MND(SE), sent his end
of
tour report
to ACM Torpy.221
472.
Maj Gen Dutton
described the victim-initiated Passive Infrared Explosively
Formed
Projectile
as the “dominant feature” of his last four months in Iraq. It had
restricted
219
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 12 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Sunni
Outreach’.
220
eGram
21055/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 17 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Sunni Arab
Outreach’.
221
Report
Dutton to Torpy, 12 December 2005, ‘June to December 2005 –
Hauldown Report’.
567