The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
59.
After reading
the JIC Assessment, Mr Blair commented:
“The
absolute key is to divide the Sunnis from the jihadists. I need a
proper
submission
on how this can be done with a detailed plan. I then want to get it
agreed
with GWB
[President Bush].”23
60.
By the end of
June, the names of the additional 15 Sunni representatives for
the
Constitutional
Committee had not been agreed.24
The British
Embassy Baghdad was
told that
de-Ba’athification checks were not complete but pressed for the
list to be
accepted in
full, on the basis that the conditions for membership must still be
met. Any
further
delay would mean the Committee had fewer than six weeks to complete
its task.
61.
On 5 July,
Mr Patey reported that the TNA had formally endorsed the
Constitutional
Committee
(now re-named a Commission) with its additional 15 Sunni
representatives.25
The first
full meeting of all 71 members was scheduled for the following
day.
62.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Blair with an update on the constitutional process
on 5 July.26
He reported
that the timetable remained “tight, but doable”. The UK would need
to
maintain
pressure on the constitutional drafters and senior Iraqi
politicians to stick to the
principle
of consensus and work towards agreement on a document which
reflected the
values and
aspirations of all Iraqis.
63.
Mr Straw
enclosed a paper produced by the FCO Research Analysts which set
out
the
substantive issues that the Constitutional Commission needed to
address. They
were:
•
Fundamental
rights, including freedom of religion, expression, movement
and
assembly,
and equality of all citizens before the law.
•
Using the
TAL as the basis of the new Constitution. It was essential that
the
constitutional
process was Iraqi-led “using the TAL where helpful but not
being
‘cut and
pasted’ from it”.
•
The
inclusion of language on how the Constitution could be amended;
this was
particularly
important given concern among Sunni Arabs that they had not
had
sufficient
involvement in its development.
•
De-Ba’athification
– in the interests of national unity, the UK wanted to
ensure
these
provisions did not become “more draconian” than the existing
provisions
in the
TAL.
23
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 1 July 2005,
‘Iraq Update’.
24
eGram
7986/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 30 June 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution:
Nearing Crunch Point?’
25
eGram
8222/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 5 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Agreement on
Expanded Constitutional
Commission’.
26
Letter
Straw to Prime Minister, 5 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution’
attaching Paper Research Analysts,
June 2005,
‘Constitutional Issues’.
498