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6.5  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003
“The Planning Unit [IPU] will also focus on the shape of the Iraqi political process
needed to underpin a handover to Iraqi rule, which the US see as occurring
18 months to two years after invasion. Other issues include the management
of Iraq’s oil and whether and where the UK should run its own sector until Iraqi
sovereignty is restored.”
254.  The record of the next meeting, on 21 February, described the co-ordinating role
of the AHGI:
“… the Ad Hoc Group draws together work related to Iraq as follows:
Work on post-Saddam issues led by the Iraq Planning Unit. This includes
the HMT [HM Treasury]-led sub-group on economic and financial issues;
Consular planning; and
HMT/CCS [Civil Contingencies Secretariat]-led domestic contingency
planning (the Stephens Group).
“AHGI receives updates on military and intelligence issues, but these issues are
handled elsewhere. AHGI provides a forum for deciding how to cover any new Iraq-
related issues. There is some read across from pre-existing DTI [Department of
Trade and Industry] and HMT Whitehall groups looking at oil.”124
255.  The evidence in this Section indicates that, after the creation of the IPU,
neither Sir Michael Jay, nor Mr Ricketts as the senior FCO official tasked by Sir
Michael to direct all aspects of FCO Iraq work, instructed the IPU or other parts of
the FCO contributing to the IPU to:
provide thorough analysis of a range of possible post-conflict scenarios,
not just the best case;
identify the need for contingency plans and preparations to address each
of those scenarios; or
provide a realistic assessment of the UK’s civilian capabilities and
resources in the light of its likely obligations in Iraq.
Domestic contingency planning: the Stephens Group
256.  After expressions of concern by Permanent Secretaries about the possible impact
on the UK of war in Iraq, Sir Andrew Turnbull had agreed in January 2003 that the AHGI
should conduct further work on domestic contingencies.125
124 Minute Dodd to Manning, 25 February 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
125 Minute Dodd to Manning, 13 January 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
355
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