The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“now simply ignore the conditions that you have stipulated”.34 Sir David reported that he

had twice made very clear to Dr Rice that:

“… before we would commit to military action, we must exhaust the UN inspectors

route; there must be progress in stabilising Arab/Israel; and there must be a

campaign to explain the Saddam menace to domestic and international public

opinion.”

69. In a meeting with Mr Richard Armitage, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Sir David

Manning had been told that “a UK officer at Tampa had said that the UK would provide

an armoured division”. That had been “dropped into the conversation” of the most senior

US policy-makers.35

70. Asked about that meeting and the fact that Mr Armitage had been told that Mr Blair

had discussed the question of a British armoured division taking part in the invasion

with President Bush at Crawford, Sir David Manning told the Inquiry: “Yes I didn’t

know that.”36

71. Sir David subsequently stated:

“I think the message that he [Mr Blair] wanted to be with the Americans in the broad

sense would be correct … throughout the crisis he felt if push came to shove, the

Americans should not be left to do this on their own. But I think at this stage still

he believes there may be a better way to do this, and I think his willingness to

stay engaged will also have been a calculation that that would have improved the

chances of persuading the Americans to go back to the UN.

“So I don’t myself think … in April or May … he had made his mind up he was going

to send troops. I think he was always ready to do it, but always hoped he wouldn’t

have to.”37

72. Asked, in the context of an offer of a division, whether the military planners were

getting ahead of the policy, Sir David Manning told the Inquiry that he was:

“… surprised they had said that because certainly later … when there is a request

from the MOD to the Prime Minister to give an indication of what he would be willing

to sign up for, he refuses. So it doesn’t seem logical to me.”38

73. A letter from Sir Christopher Meyer on 20 May following up Sir David’s visit

reported that “military planning was grinding on”, and described the UK conditions as

“preconditions for action against Saddam”.39

34 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 19 May 2002, ‘Visit to Washington: 17 May’.

35 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 18 May 2002, ‘David Manning’s Visit to Washington, 17 May; Iraq’.

36 Private hearing, 24 June 2010, page 38.

37 Private hearing, 24 June 2010, page 39.

38 Private hearing, 24 June 2010, page 40.

39 Letter Meyer to Manning, 20 May 2002, ‘Your Visit to Washington’.

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