3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
dangerous
regimes by military repression, or removing them by military force,
may
in the
long run even make things worse.
“So on most
cases the French favour a policy of engagement …”
85.
Sir John
identified Iraq as “the real problem”. France had “long been at
odds” with
the US and
UK over “the basic analysis: arguing that a policy of punitive
sanctions and
containment
of Saddam is in the long term likely to create even greater
incentives for
the regime
to proliferate and more antagonism in the population, and so store
up new
dangers,
particularly in the absence of real MEPP progress”.
86.
Before 11
September, France had felt US policy was moving in its
direction:
“Now,
although work continues on the Goods Review List (a French idea),
they
suspect the
gap will widen again … They are not necessarily totally opposed to
an
American
operation to remove Saddam, which they increasingly see as
inevitable,
provided
that it is supported in the UN and in the region; is carefully
thought through
in military
terms; and forms part of a realistic project for creating a better
and more
stable
future for the country and the region. So far they do not think
these conditions
have been
met. The lack of American willingness so far to follow through on
nation
building in
Afghanistan has not encouraged them. Nor does the present
parlous
87.
In addition,
France was “not convinced that the approach of naming key
states
of concern,
and dealing with them by military means or diplomatic isolation”
would
“solve the
underlying problems of WMD proliferation or terrorism”. Those
threats were
developing
through “shadowy non-state networks” which would “not go away”
even
if examples
were made of Afghanistan and Iraq; “and may well gain more
recruits
over time”.
88.
Sir John
concluded the French “instinct remains to back the Americans
in
upholding
international stability when push comes to shove”. What France
wanted
“above all”
was “to be consulted and involved, and to have some input into
analysis and
policy
before they are faced with the choice of following US decisions or
not”. The UK
was “likely
to be in the front line of any split” and had “a particular
incentive to act, and to
do so
quickly. If we wait until the Americans have a fully worked out
plan, attitudes may
well have
hardened too far on both sides.”
89.
Sir John
suggested the UK needed to persuade:
•
The US
“using the influence we have earned” to explain their thinking
and
“to share
intelligence as much as they can to illustrate the real, present
WMD
dangers of
the Iraqi regime; to explain why they believe they can remove
the
regime
without setting the region on fire; and, once they have a plan,
to explain
31
Telegram
123 Paris to FCO London, 19 February 2002, ‘US Foreign Policy:
France and the Axis of Evil’.
401