The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
intention
to resume a downward trajectory” after pausing at current levels
and “would
therefore
need a clear script on this for his meeting with Petraeus on 1
May”.
1046.
President Bush
had “understood our sensitivities regarding the conduct of
the
recent ISF
operation in Basra” but added that “the US had been operating under
the
same
constraints, and believed the security situation in Basra had
improved as a result”.
1047.
Mr McDonald
told the Iraq Strategy Group:
“It was now
clear that there was a shared UK/US operation in the South, and
that
we would
need to decide on their tasks and the division of labour. We needed
to
focus on
our remaining political, economic and military tasks. The first two
required
provincial
elections to take place, and tangible outcomes from the work of
Michael
Wareing and
the Basra Development Commission. The third would require a
focus
on training
and mentoring 14 Div, and might involve an accelerated push to
achieve
effect
earlier, so that we could draw down combat forces more quickly in
2009.
Our residual
tasks should require no more than a few hundred
troops.”
1048.
Lt Gen Wall
reported to the Group that attack levels – including IEDs
and
IDF –
were lower in Basra since the Charge of the Knights, and JAM
resistance to ISF
operations
was waning. The challenge would be to prevent JAM’s
re-infiltration, but it
was likely
that the ISF would stay in the South in large numbers and therefore
act as
a
deterrent. He reported also a “risk” that 14th Division might be
moved into Maysan,
“which
would have implications for our MiTTs”.
1049.
Lt Gen
Houghton’s visit to Baghdad had “gone as planned” and
although
Gen Petraeus
would prefer a “gentle glide path rather than rapid drawdown”
once
14th Division
was fully trained, he had “reluctantly agreed” to the UK’s
proposals.
1050.
The next
likely focus for ISF operations would be Mosul, which would
have
implications
for US resources in Basra, as would any uplift in Sadr City. Gen
Petraeus
remained
concerned about the lack of capacity on the border and had urged
the UK
to consider
greater use of private military companies (for example to provide
airport
security,
which might free up 200-300 troops). Lt Gen Wall observed that the
UK was
“doing very
little with the police, now that Jalil had departed”.
1051.
Mr Miliband
visited Baghdad and Erbil in mid-April.517
On 29 April,
he wrote to
Mr Brown:
“However
unfortunate its genesis, Maliki’s operation in Basra has created
an
opportunity
to reshape our approach there and set a new direction
towards
transition.
2009 is the year we will need to move from a Basra military
strategy to
an Iraq
political and economic strategy. If we get the strategy right I
believe we can
517
Letter
Miliband to Prime Minister, 29 April 2008, ‘Iraq’.
378