3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
5.
Reporting
on his visit to Washington on 31 January 2003, Mr Blair
told
Parliament
on 3 February that Saddam Hussein was not co-operating as
required
by UN
Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1441(2002) and, if that
continued,
a second
resolution should be passed to confirm such a material
breach.
6.
Mr Blair
continued to set the need for action against Iraq in the
context
of the need
to be seen to enforce the will of the UN and to deter future
threats.
7.
Following his
meeting with President Bush in Washington on 31 January
2003,
Mr Blair
made a statement to Parliament on Monday
3 February.1
8.
Mr Blair
described Iraq as the “immediate focus of the visit” although he
and
President
Bush had also discussed the Middle East Peace Process
(MEPP),
Afghanistan,
and global poverty and development. Mr Blair also reported
that he had
had
meetings and discussions with other Heads of State and
Government.
9.
Stating that,
“We are entering the final phase of a 12-year history of the
disarmament
of Iraq”,
Mr Blair said that Saddam Hussein had “consistently flouted”
27 “separate and
categorical
obligations” in a series of 17 resolutions. That was why a
sanctions regime
had been in
place, which “because of the way in which Saddam has applied it,
has
caused
wholly unnecessary suffering for the Iraqi people”.
“Eight
weeks have now passed since Saddam was given his final
chance.
Six hundred
weeks have passed since he was given his first chance.
The
evidence of
co-operation withheld is unmistakable. Saddam has still not
answered
the
questions concerning thousands of missing munitions and tons of
chemical and
biological
agents unaccounted for.”
11.
Mr Blair
reported the recent finds by the weapons inspectors and drew
attention
to the
report published by No.10 the previous weekend, which made clear
that Iraq had
“a huge
infrastructure of deception and concealment designed to prevent the
inspectors
from doing
their job”.
12.
That report,
the No.10 dossier, ‘Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment,
Deception
and
Intimidation’, is addressed in Section 4.3.
1
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 3
February 2003, columns 21-38.
181