The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
937.
Mr Rycroft
went on to outline how Mr Blair thought existing activity
could be
improved:
“(a)
Iraqi-isation. We must do whatever it takes to get the ICDC and
Iraqi police
into shape.
Every main road has to be guarded, oil refineries rebuilt,
electricity
generation
on target …
(b)
Communications. There needs to be a concerted campaign in Iraq and
abroad
to explain
what the security problem actually is, and how it is a
deliberate
attempt to
prevent the Iraqi people from getting the benefit of what we
are
doing. We
need to provide top security for al-Iraqiya’s [a newly set up
Iraqi
TV channel]
reporters and staff; strengthen the Coalition’s Arabic
media
capability;
improve the co-ordination between military and political to give
real
time
information to spokesmen; and vastly improve the Iraqi
government’s
communications
capability.
(c)
Reconstruction spending. There is a damaging gap between
‘obligated’ funds
and actual
spending … We need urgent clarity and agreement on what
will
replace the
CPA outside Baghdad after 30 June.
(d) The
courts. We need to ensure that trials of criminals and sentencing
begin
again
…
(e)
Political process. We should not exclude IGC members altogether
…
(f)
Security agreement. We need urgent agreement on the relationship
between
the MNF and
the Iraqi authorities and Iraqi forces after 30 June.”
938.
Mr Blair
also asked for answers to a number of detailed questions including
how
many
civilians had been killed in Iraq and whether the UK was confident
that the security
part of the
transition plan for Southern Iraq would work.
939.
On the same
day, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice another Note from
Mr Blair, and
asked her
to show it to President Bush before their video conference the next
day.519
940.
In his Note
Mr Blair set out the detailed analysis that Mr Rycroft
had communicated
across
Whitehall, which was summarised as:
“The good
news is that the problem we face is not multi-faceted. It is
simple:
security.
The bad news is that I am not sure we yet have a fully worked-out
strategy
to tackle
it. But we can get one.”
941.
On 26 April,
Mr Rycroft wrote back to Mr Hoon’s office in relation to
the US request
for
deployment of additional UK troops.520
He stated
“our decisions on this should be
clearly
military-led”.
519
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 26 April 2004, [untitled] attaching Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
520
Letter
Rycroft to Baker, 26 April 2004, ‘Iraq: US approaches for
additional UK forces’.
360