6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

by purely operational concerns. At the very least we must validate the current

operational considerations strategically.”

1013. The paper also set out the factors likely to determine the size of the UK military’s

post-conflict commitment:

“The scale of the UK commitment to AM will be determined by the size of force

deployed for war-fighting in the first instance. Very rapidly, however, the demands

of the AM phase are likely to drive the requirement for a different force structure.

While the desire will evidently be to effect as rapid a drawdown as feasible, an initial

increase in deployed strength may be required in order to stabilise the situation.

A mass PW [prisoner of war] problem and/or a humanitarian crisis could both

prompt this, requiring an increase in light forces and logistic effort. The options for

meeting such a surge demand must be considered in advance in order to ensure

a quick response.

“A final view on the extent of any long-term (post-12 months) UK commitment

may not be required at this stage. It is necessary, however, to provide a baseline

assumption for the level of commitment for the crucial ‘first roulement’ post-conflict in

order to allow commitments to be balanced. It is suggested the assumption should

be up to a medium-scale (Air and Land) commitment for up to six months of the

AM phase. A requirement to commit at or around this level for up to two years might

well be necessary to ensure any lasting progress towards the UK end state.”

1014. The SPG paper was included in the Christmas reading pack prepared for Mr Blair

by the MOD.487

1015. On 16 December Maj Gen Fry produced a paper on deployment of a UK

stabilisation force in the event of the early collapse of the Iraqi regime or military leading

to a “loss of control”.488

1016. “Early collapse” was defined as the collapse of the Iraqi regime less than 60 days

after “P Day”; “loss of control” as “the period between the collapse of the Iraqi regime

and the establishment of an effective alternative providing law and order and security”.

1017. Maj Gen Fry explained that:

“Rapid intervention by the Coalition may be required to stabilise the situation,

including support to an interim government. Current Package 3 deployment

timelines would limit the arrival of sufficient and appropriate UK military capability in

time. Consequently there is a need to develop a contingency plan that would enable

the UK to gain an early footprint on the ground, providing influence in theatre and

achieving strategic impact.”

487 Letter Watkins to Manning, 20 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Christmas Reading’.

488 Paper DCJO(Ops), 16 December 2002, ‘Provision of a UK Stabilisation Force’.

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