The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
bomb]
strike that seemed to have dramatically altered the situation in
Basra (public
perception
was that Chemical Ali [Ali Hassan al-Majid] had been
killed).” 248
410.
The UK was
well informed about the structure and capabilities of the
Iraqi
armed
forces but it had no intelligence pre-conflict on Iraq’s plans for
the defence
of Basra.
The JIC had assessed:
•
many
Regular Army units bypassed and left behind as the result of a
rapid
Coalition
advance towards Baghdad would probably surrender rather
than
fight;
•
only
Baghdad was politically vital to the Iraqi regime; and
•
there was
little evidence that Iraq was preparing for a hard-fought
defence
of Basra
and other urban areas in southern Iraq.
411.
The DIS
advised that Iraqi irregular forces, including the Fedayeen,
were
likely to
be involved in the defence of Basra, but it did not predict the
degree of
initial
resistance to Coalition Forces.
412.
The
assessments pre-conflict about the structure, conventional
capabilities and
intentions
of the Iraqi armed forces, are set out in Section 6.1. The
assessment of the
Iraqi
regime’s intentions in relation to the defence of Basra and the
nature and intentions
of Iraqi
irregular forces is summarised in the Box below.
On 4 July
2002, the JIC assessed that the “Saddam Fedayeen”, which were
“under the
control of
Saddam’s oldest son” were “possibly 10–15,000 strong” and had “been
used in
the past to
deal with civil disturbances”.249
In its
Assessment of 21 August, the JIC judged that:
“Iraq’s
likely strategy for a ground war would be to make any Coalition
advance as
slow and
costly as possible, trying to force the Coalition to fight in urban
areas.” 250
The JIC
stated:
“We have
little insight into how the Iraqi military might plan to fight any
ground war
… At
present we have little evidence to judge whether Iraq sees urban or
guerrilla
warfare as
feasible options. Iraqi effectiveness would be mitigated by
problems of
command and
control, inadequate training and poor morale. We doubt that
guerrilla
activity
would be very effective; urban warfare is more
plausible.”
248
Report,
‘Post Operation Report – Version 2 Operation TELIC’, 6 October
2003.
249
JIC
Assessment, 4 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion’.
250
JIC
Assessment, 21 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military
Options’.
72