The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
84.
In relation to
reports of the recruitment of new scientists to work on BW
research
and
activity at a facility formerly associated with BW, the Butler
Report stated that
the
“additional intelligence” identified “came from human intelligence
and imagery”. It
concluded
that, “although the human intelligence was recording events that
had taken
place some
time previously”, it had been fairly reflected by the
JIC.40
85.
Sir John
Scarlett told the Inquiry that the May 2001 Assessment had drawn
“on two
big
assessments” in 2000 and provided “a sort of starting point”. By
that time:
•
“… there
was heightened concern … about possible
nuclear-related
procurement
and longer-term plans to enrich uranium.”
•
“Iraq was
assessed to retain some stocks of chemical … agents and
weapons,
but there
were no details on locations or quantities. But there was a lot
of
attention
being paid to the reconstruction of … facilities which had been
used in
the past
for chemical agent production.”
•
There was
“clear evidence of continuing biological warfare activity …
[T]he
intelligence
about mobile production laboratories … was taken seriously.
And
… there was
a lot of emphasis on the capability of Iraq’s … industry to
start
production
of agents very quickly if a decision was taken to do
that.”
•
If Iraq
“were to extend” the range of permitted ballistic missiles and then
“design
longer
range missiles, that was given a lot of prominence in the
assessment as
a step
change in the progress they were making”.41
86.
Sir John
subsequently added that the Assessment was:
“… a fairly
firm judgement based on limited intelligence, but taking account of
a
lot of
other issues, including past behaviour … not just in terms of use
but also of
deception
and concealment and so on.”42
87.
The
perception of the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD programmes should
be
seen in the
context of wider concerns about the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical
and
biological weapons and their delivery systems, particularly
ballistic missiles.
By 2000
this was regarded as a major threat.
88.
The Butler
Report examined the background to the concerns about
the
nuclear,
chemical, biological and ballistic missile programmes of Libya,
Iran,
North Korea
and Iraq, and the state of knowledge about global trade and
potential
sources of
proliferation. It also reviewed the intelligence available on
the
possibility
that terrorist groups might seek to use such weapons.
40
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs
242-243.
41
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 35-36.
42
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 42.
30