3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
594.
The US
Principals were minded to see benchmarks as a record of what Iraq
had
not done,
rather than a headline list of what Saddam Hussein should
do.
595.
Sir
Christopher also advised that the UK’s views were “best registered
directly
by the
Prime Minister” with President Bush.
596.
Mr Blair
sent President Bush a six-page Note on 19 February.
597.
Mr Blair
proposed focusing on the absence of full co-operation
and
a “simple”
resolution stating that Iraq had failed to take the final
opportunity,
with a
side statement defining tough tests of co-operation and a
vote
on 14 March to
provide a deadline for action.
598.
Mr Hoon
was not consulted about the approach to be adopted.
599.
Mr Blair
sent President Bush a six-page Note on 19 February.164
600.
Mr Blair
stated that it was “a defining moment in EU/US relations and
in
the
future direction of Europe”. He wrote that it was “apparent to
me from the EU
summit that
France wants to make this a crucial test: is Europe America’s
partner
or competitor? …
For the first time … a strong bloc prepared to challenge
France
and Germany”
was emerging.
601.
Mr Blair
wrote that “European public opinion seemed to favour France”
and
that was
being used “to embarrass the pro-US case, to inhibit the pro-US
leaders”.
Those
leaders had been:
“…
remarkably firm in the face of really difficult polls and
demonstrations.
“But the
issue will be this: is it the US that is forced to go it alone with
the UK,
or is it France
that is left isolated with a choice as to whether to use its
veto?
“That is in
turn a function of where public opinion is outside … the
US.”
602.
Mr Blair
added that was “far more nuanced than people think”. In his view,
public
opinion
outside the US was:
“… not
against conflict in all circumstances. What they fear is that we
are hell bent
on war,
come what may, that we don’t really want the UN to
succeed.”
603.
Mr Blair
wrote that fear was “absurd”:
“The issue
of time for the inspections has become vicariously, the focus
for
this sentiment.
At the heart of this is a confusion between active and
passive
co-operation.
The duty on Saddam is to co-operate fully; ie actively to help
the
Inspectors.
If he isn’t he’s in breach. But the France/Germany view – too
much
shared by
others on the Security Council – is that the inspectors should
have
164
Letter
Manning to Rice, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq’ attaching Note [Blair to
Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
287