The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
433.
Mr Hoon
also challenged the assurances offered by Mr Brown and
Mr Boateng that
operations
in Iraq would not be affected:
“… to
suggest that cuts to the core Defence Budget will have no impact on
military
capability
or morale reveals a lack of understanding about how defence
works.
The net
additional military costs are only one element, and a relatively
small
element, of
what goes into creating the military capability deployed in Iraq.
Cuts in
core
equipment, logistics and training programmes will inevitably affect
operations
in Iraq.
The only question is how quickly. The effect on morale will be more
or less
immediate.”
434.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Mr Blair in similar terms on the same
day.254
435.
On 6 October,
Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary sent Mr Heywood a list of the
main
measures
the MOD was taking to meet Mr Hoon’s commitment to save up to
£500m
in the
current financial year.255
Those
were:
•
further
reductions in activity, especially overseas exercises;
•
paring back
logistic support;
•
deferring
plans to buy a fifth C‑17 strategic lift aircraft; and
•
delaying or
reducing spend on other future equipment programmes,
including
the
Battlefield Light Utility Helicopter, the Nimrod MRA4 and the
Watchkeeper
Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV).
436.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary wrote:
“These
measures would not directly impact on operations in Iraq, but would
begin
to cut into
training and support needed for motivated Armed Forces capable
of
sustaining
the operations there, especially if the situation on the ground
escalates,
or in
responding to new crises.”
437.
The
procurement of UAVs for Iraq is considered in Section
14.1.
438.
Mr Heywood
attempted to broker an agreement between the MOD and
the
Treasury.
He advised Mr Blair on 7 October:
“In brief,
MOD are requesting an extra £650/1000/1275m over the
next
three years …
“There is
no plausible reason why MOD’s non‑Iraq spending should need to
increase
by 9
percent in the current year; and the Government’s Chief Accounting
Adviser,
Sir Andrew
Likierman, is absolutely clear that there has been an
unacceptable
breakdown
in financial control in the department (with too much money
allocated
out to
budget‑holders and the central finance function too weak to control
what they
254
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 29 September 2003, ‘Ministry of Defence
Budget’.
255
Letter
Davies to Heywood, 6 October 2003, ‘Ministry of Defence
Budget’.
514