The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1208.
Joint FCO/MOD
advice followed on 25 March.
1209.
At the Ad Hoc
Meeting on Iraq on 22 March, Mr Blair requested advice
from
Mr Straw
on the UK’s approach to reconstruction “and associated
conferences”.515
1210.
Mr Blair
discussed the need for a UN “badge” for post-conflict activity
with
President
Bush on 22 March. He suggested that there should be two
separate
resolutions:
one on OFF, which should proceed quickly; and a second
on
post‑conflict
administration to follow.
1211.
In a telephone
call on 22 March, Mr Blair raised the UN’s role with
President
Bush.516
Mr Blair
said that it was essential to get a UN “badge” for post-conflict
efforts
and that,
while the Coalition did not want to hand over the results of its
efforts to the UN,
a Security
Council resolution on post-conflict administration would help the
Coalition get
access to
UN funding, including from the IFIs.
1212.
Mr Blair
proposed that different parts of the draft resolution should
proceed
on
different timescales; a resolution on OFF should move quickly, with
one covering
administration
after the conflict to follow.
1213.
On 23
March, Mr Blair reassured Ministers that UK and US positions
on
the role of
the UN were not far apart. He believed the US was misreading
the
implications
of UN authorisation.
1214.
On 23 March,
Mr Blair told the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq that, on the
draft
resolution,
“British and American positions were not so far
apart”.517
He believed
that the
US was
misreading the implications of what UN authorisation meant and
added: “It was
more a
matter of timing than substance.”
1215.
At the UN,
Mr Annan told Sir Jeremy Greenstock that he would not want
to
see an
arrangement “subjugating UN activity to Coalition
activity”.
1216.
Mr Annan
also made it clear, in public, that during any occupation it
was
the
Occupying Power that was responsible for the welfare of the people.
Without
detracting
from those responsibilities, the UN would do whatever it could to
help
the Iraqi
population.
1217.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock discussed post-conflict Iraq with Mr Annan on 24
March,
in advance
of a meeting between Mr Annan and Dr Rice later in the
day.518
Sir
Jeremy
told
Mr Annan that he “assumed that the UN would not want to run
Iraq nor its security
sector”.
Mr Annan told him that “Coalition respect for Iraqi
sovereignty, territorial integrity
515
Minutes, 19
March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
516
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 22 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 22 March:
Post-Conflict
Issues’.
517
Minutes, 23
March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
518
Telegram
526 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq Phase IV: UN
Dynamics’.
526